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EDITOR’S NOTE

O

ur issue begins with Judge Procter Hug, Jr.’s thoughts on judicial independence under pressure. We reprint the remarks he gave as the featured speaker at the American Judges Association’s annual educational
conference in October 2001. Judge Hug’s comments, as well as those of AJA
president Bonnie Sudderth in her president’s column, deal with issues faced by
judges in times of crisis, including in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks in the United States.
Our articles begin with an exchange regarding the suggestibility of children
as a factor in assessing their credibility as witnesses. A bit of background will
place these articles in context.
In our Summer 2000 issue, we featured an essay by Stephen J. Ceci and
Maggie Bruck titled, “Why Judges Must Insist
on Electronically Preserved Recordings of
Child Interviews.” In it, Ceci and Bruck presented their suggestion that child-witness interviews generally should be electronically
recorded so that the extent to which poor interviewing techniques led the children to adopt
suggested responses could be assessed. That
essay was both an introduction to and an outgrowth of Ceci and Bruck’s larger research,
which is explained in detail in their book,
Jeopardy in the Courtroom: A Scientific Analysis
of Children’s Testimony, which won the 1999
William James Award of the American
Psychological Association for best book.
Recently, the work of Ceci and Bruck has been criticized by USC law professor Tom Lyon. For the benefit of judges, we present an overview of this
debate in a pair of articles. Forensic psychologist David Martindale, who frequently testifies in court as an expert witness, defends the Ceci-Bruck research
and position. Martindale suggests that improperly suggestive interviewing
techniques are sufficiently widespread to be of serious concern and that expert
testimony can appropriately educate judges and jurors. Lyon, who is both a
law professor and a psychologist, replies to Martindale, contending that current
research does not show that improperly suggestive interviewing techniques are
widespread and that expert testimony on that subject is not always appropriate. We think you’ll find their exchange a helpful introduction to this subject.
For those interested in greater depth, all of the leading articles are cited in the
footnotes of the two pieces.
We also present Professor Whitebread’s annual review of the civil decisions
of the United States Supreme Court for the past term. As you will see, Bush v.
Gore was far from the only significant case decided.
Last, we present the winning essay from the American Judges Association’s
law school essay contest for 2000. Roxana Cardenas, who went to law school
while already employed as a court interpreter in Los Angeles, has both interesting experiences and suggestions, which she shares in this article. —SL
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President’s Column
Bonnie Sudderth

July 4. December 7. September 11. Some dates, standing
alone, and without more, convey meaning so profound that
human words may serve only to limit the thoughts and emotions embodied therein.
Nevertheless, when Americans consider July 4, they say “the
birth of our nation.” It was the birth date of a democratic form
of government—of a nation based upon the principle of government by the people, of the people, and for the people—and
of a nation founded on the concept that all men (and women)
are created equal.
December 7, of course, is “a date which will live in infamy.”
It is the date when the United States, which had
theretofore attempted to isolate itself from the
entanglements of other nations, was involuntarily
thrust into the fray, into a great world war, from
which it emerged an even greater nation, a leader
among all nations.
September 11, 2001. How will historians characterize the significance of that date? Most likely it
will be remembered as the date when the world
went to war against terrorism. And if it is a war
eventually won, it is certain that even in the centuries to come
September 11 will have a special place in the history books.
But consider for a moment an even greater significance to
this date. It may not be as exciting as the birth of a nation or
as bold as a war fought and won. Just as, in the history books,
when July 4 is remembered it is not so much about a document
that was signed on that date as it is about ideas of a new nation
expressed therein, likewise, it is possible that September 11
may not be remembered so much for the acts of terrorism that
occurred on that date as it will be for how our nation, founded
upon principles of liberty, fought to preserve the very liberties
that were threatened by the terrorist acts.
Benjamin Franklin, one of America’s founding fathers, was
said to have remarked that anyone who would sacrifice liberty
for the sake of safety deserved neither. Yet that is exactly the
balancing act that the United States, and indeed other free
nations, face as we endure the aftermath of September 11. Will
September 11 be remembered as the day that our liberties were
tested and lost? Or will it be the day that we began a serious
debate over how much, if any, liberty we as a nation can sacrifice for the sake of safety and still be a nation of liberty rather
than oppression?

There are those who say that if we allow September 11 to
erode our constitutional freedoms, then the terrorists will have
won. There are others who argue that safety can be achieved
within the bounds of our constitutional principles without violating basic liberties. This debate is one that, according to our
system of government, rightfully belongs in the legislative
branch. And we, as judges, are watching as the debate ensues.
But we will be the ultimate arbiters of these issues. When
the liberties of our nation are tested, they will be tested in the
court systems across our country.
Our federal courts will grapple with questions of profiling
and discrimination as new federal standards and
restrictions are imposed on air and other forms of
travel to reduce the opportunities for terrorism.
State and local courts will labor over constitutional
challenges to new state statutes and local ordinances
designed to make our communities safer. The ageold issues of searches, seizures, and due process
rights of the accused will take on added dimensions
in criminal courts throughout the land as more citizens are accused of aiding and abetting terrorists or
terrorist organizations.
Judges will be called upon to make difficult decisions, decisions that will potentially subject them to public ridicule or
clamor. Yet, as judges, we know we can never yield to public
pressure in circumvention of our duty to uphold the constitution—though our job security may be at stake.
As Alexander Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers
(No. 78), without oversight by courts of justice, all rights and
privileges reserved in our Constitution are meaningless. It is
not only the province but also the obligation of courts to conduct this exercise when properly called upon to do so, and to
take our obligations seriously and somberly.
The history books may tell a story of how the horrific events
of September 11 challenged the fundamental freedoms of our
democracy. It is my earnest hope and most sincere expectation
that the volumes will be replete with examples of brave and
independent judges who labored over difficult decisions when
called upon to do so—judges who did their part in our system
of justice to preserve the constitution while helping to make
the world a safer place for ourselves and our loved ones.
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REMARKS

On Judicial Independence
Under Pressure*
Procter Hug, Jr.

F

irst, I would like to give my personal
welcome to all of you to my home
state and city, Reno, Nevada. It is a
pleasure to have you here at this annual
conference. The timing of the conference,
of course, in these days following the terrorist strike in New York and Washington,
D.C., made it difficult for those planning
the conference and for those of you who
traveled here with air traffic restricted the
way it is. I am pleased to see the turnout
and commend those of you that had to
travel here from some distance.
Our President has emphasized the
importance of restoring confidence in our
air traffic and the importance of our nation
in continuing its normal operations.
Otherwise, we would be doing the very
thing the terrorists would hope, that is, to
create disruption of the functioning of our
daily activities. Thus, I want to congratulate the American Judges Association for
proceeding with this conference despite
the difficulties presented by the terrorist
attack.
When Judge Jim VanWinkle asked me
to speak at the opening of your conference, I didn’t realize that it would be billed
as the Honorable Tom C. Clark Lecture.
You know he was truly a great judge and a
wonderful man. He left the bench so that
his son, Ramsey Clark, could serve as U.S.
Attorney General without conflicts. But
when he stepped down he did some great
things for judicial education. It was at his
insistence that the Federal Judicial Center
was created for federal judges and the
National Judicial College, that is now here
in Reno, was established for the continuing education of state judges. I remember
participating in the groundbreaking ceremonies with Justice Clark for the National
Judicial College building, which you will
be visiting.
With so many visiting judges here it

*

reminds me of a story that I really just can’t
resist telling. It involves a northern judge
who was sent down to a small southern
community. It was quite hot, and it was a
small courthouse with no air conditioning,
so that all of the windows and doors were
open for ventilation purposes. The lawyers
seemed to be going on interminably, and
the judge was getting rather exasperated.
And he said, finally, “Let’s get to the point.
I don’t want to hear any more about this. I
just want to get to the point. Let’s get this
trial finished and your final arguments finished. And what are all these flies that are
buzzing around my head?”
And the lawyer said, “Well, your Honor,
down here we call them ‘circle flies.’”
“Well why would you call them circle
flies?” the judge asked.
“Well, your Honor, it’s because they’re
known to circle around the rear end of a
horse,” the lawyer replied.
The judge shot back, “Counsel, I hope
that you’re not intimating that there is any
resemblance in this Court to the rear end
of a horse.”
“Oh, no, Your Honor,” replied the
lawyer, “but it sure is hard to fool them circle flies!”
Well, now on to judicial independence.
Although we recognize the importance of
our independent judiciary in this country,
it takes only a visit to a foreign country
that is seeking to establish a democracy
such as ours to emphasize that importance. So often the judiciary in these
countries is answerable to an executive
branch, thus, susceptible to controlled
decisions or removal of the judge. Highhanded actions by a powerful leader or
local officials frequently determine the
outcomes of cases. Without an independent judiciary there is no mechanism to
serve as a brake to forestall such actions.
When we meet with foreign judges in their

Judge Procter Hug, Jr., presented the Tom C. Clark lecture at the
annual education conference of the American Judges Association
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countries, judicial independence such as
we have here in the United States is the
hardest to understand and yet the aspect
that the judges most admire in our judicial
system. Judges who visit our country,
through such programs as we have at the
National Judicial College, are struck by
that quality of independence that we have
in this nation.
Although our legal system is the envy
of much of the world, we hear much criticism in our own country of lawyers and
judges. But we should take real pride in
the contribution of judges and lawyers to
the formation of our country. Of the 55
delegates to amend the Articles of
Confederation, which we now call the
Constitutional Convention, 60% were
lawyers or judges. Throughout the succeeding years, lawyers and judges have
guided the continuing development of our
system of government. I stress continuing
development because it is not something
like climbing a hill when we can say, “Ahhah! We have achieved the objective.” It
is more like adjusting a system of governance to the changing times, indeed, in
this era it is very rapidly changing times,
with the breathtaking advances in science
and technology and our dependence on a
global economy.
We as lawyers and judges have to take
pride in the part the legal profession has
played in the development of our nation.
Lawyers and judges have caused citizens
and institutions to face up to themselves,
to consider important social changes when
other institutions are not willing to do so.
It has frequently been in the face of vigorous opposition and antagonism by those
who have had a vested interest in the status quo. That’s why lawyers, as a class, can
be unpopular because they are frequently
working for unpopular, though much
needed, changes in society.

on October 1, 2001 in Reno, Nevada. We reprint his remarks
here.

As a result of the efforts of lawyers and
judges, segregated schools are a thing of
the past; the ballot box has been freed of
racial and property-based exclusions; standards of treatment and care in prisons and
mental institutions have been established
where inhumane conditions have existed;
exclusion of students from universities on
the basis of race has been eliminated; and
expanded opportunities for employment
have been opened up for women and
minorities. This highlights just a few of the
social changes in which lawyers and judges
have been at the forefront.
There are judges who have had truly
heroic roles in some of these changes in
the social order. Look to some of the federal judges in the South during the Civil
Rights movement. Judge John Godbold,
the former chief judge of the Eleventh
Circuit, pointed this out in a recent law
review article.* There are Frank Johnson
and Richard Rives of Alabama, and Elbert
Tuttle of Georgia, just to name a few. At a
time of great difficulty in the history of
our country, judges of the South stood up
and recognized the rights of all our people. Some of them faced extreme criticism
and ostracism in their communities. They
and their families endured threats and
lived under the protection of guards. The
home of Judge Johnson’s mother was
bombed. Judge Rives’ local newspaper
demanded that he not be buried in
Alabama soil; and the gravestone of his
only son was painted red and garbage was
heaped on it. Judge Rives loved his
church, where he had been a lay official,
where his daughter was married and his
son was buried from. He left it for another
when it posted ushers at the door to bar a
few black citizens of the faith who wished
to enter. In 1933, Alabama Circuit Judge
James Horton set aside a guilty verdict in
the second, famous Scottsboro trial. That
involved a charge against a young AfricanAmerican for raping white women. He did
so with the sure expectation that it would
cost him his seat at the next election. It
did. These judges refused to duck their
responsibility. They upheld the law and
enforced the Constitution. The best

*

description that I know of them is
expressed in the words of Maxwell
Anderson’s play, Valley Forge: “There are
some men who lift the level of the age in
which they live, so that all men stand on
higher ground.” And, indeed, the term
men as used there includes both genders—
men and women—because it is true of
both.
We federal judges with life tenure have
a great advantage in maintaining judicial
independence. It’s not as difficult for us as
it is for state judges. Most of you as state
judges have to face election in regular
terms. Thus, an unpopular decision can
not only lead to ostracism and criticism in
a community, but can end a judicial career.
Powerful politicians or interest groups can
raise large sums of money to defeat a judge
who has rendered a decision that is con-

trary to those interests. In such instances,
it takes more courage to render the right,
but unpopular decision.
The long-term respect for the judiciary
is vital to maintaining judicial independence. That respect is built in many small
ways, as well as through the high-profile
decisions. Those of you who are trial
judges have frequent contact with the general public, whether as parties, witnesses,
jurors, or persons involved in traffic
offenses. The impression that you make
on a daily basis as to fairness and civility is
more important than the abstract opinions
of we who are appellate judges.
The steps that you are taking to

John C. Godbold, “Lawyer” — A Title of Honor, 29 CUMB. L. REV.
301, 309 (1998-1999). This paragraph in the text is based on
Judge Godbold’s excellent article.
** Editor’s Note: The case to which Judge Hug refers is Hirabayashi
v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987). In it, Gordon

improve the methods of operation and
dealing with the public are very important,
including alternate dispute resolution,
drug courts, mental health courts, different ways of handling domestic violence,
and other innovations you are discussing
at this conference. Outreach into the community through schools, talks at service
clubs, and, indeed, with the media are
important in enhancing the reputation of
the judiciary and, in turn, in maintaining
judicial independence.
With the terrorist threat that has now
become evident in our society since
September 11, the role of the judiciary will
be exceptionally important. Additional
security from such terrorist attacks is
clearly required, but our constitutional
civil liberties must also be protected. It is
a delicate balance to be struck, and the
judiciary will play a vital role in doing so.
Our President has warned against bigotry
toward those that are of Mideast descent
or of the Muslim religion. It is up to us, as
judges, to guard against such bigotry.
We have not always done that well in
times of crisis. A prime example is the
internment of Japanese-Americans during
World War II, which was approved by the
Supreme Court in the Korematsu decision.
Initially, there was a curfew set up for
Japanese-Americans, which was a precursor to the internment program. A young
Japanese-American intentionally did not
comply with that curfew, believing it was a
violation of his constitutional rights. He
was convicted of the crime. And what was
astounding—the government in those
restricted travel times had no way to send
him to prison in Arizona—so he hitchhiked to prison and there spent two years
incarcerated.
Eventually, our court
reviewed his case and directed the issuance
of a writ of coram nobis, which overturned
that conviction. The government did not
seek certiorari, so we have the unusual circumstance at our Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals of reversing the Supreme Court
(which makes me a little happy given the
fact that we’ve been reversed so much by
the Supreme Court).**
Today, we have two significant issues

Hirabayashi obtained a writ of coram nobis vacating his 1942
conviction for violating a military curfew that required persons
of Japanese ancestry, whether citizens or not, to remain within
their residences from 8:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. The Ninth
Circuit based its decision in part on the suppression back in
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bearing on our civil liberties. The first is
the terrorist threat where there will be
pressure to loosen protections on civil liberties. The second is the exponential
increase in technology that can easily
invade privacy in ways that we never
dreamed of. There is currently a case in
Tampa, Florida, where there was a scan of
faces at the Super Bowl and a use by law
enforcement to link that scan to wanted
criminals. So, if you sneaked off to the
Super Bowl, you’ve been found out!
Recently, the Supreme Court decided a
case that held that it was an unlawful
search to calibrate the heat emanating
from a roof of a building to detect marijuana-growing activity within. This indicates there will be some brakes put on the
utilization of this newly invasive technology of various sorts. Then, we have the

rental car company monitoring the speed
of drivers of their cars by satellite, with the
driver’s consent buried somewhere in the
small print of the contract, which I know
you all read, just as I do, before you rent a
car. It will be important for us in the judiciary to determine whether technology or
the law will define the contours of civil
liberty.
Ours is an important calling to be able
to serve in an independent judiciary that is
so vital to our democracy. Each of us in
our various types of judgeships have the
important responsibility to maintain the
respect of the public for the manner in
which we perform our duties. Hopefully,
we will be exhibiting fairness, impartiality,
understanding, courage in our decisions,
and an awareness that the people have
entrusted us to do this important judicial

1942 and 1943 of portions of a military report and other intelligence materials that might have supported the view that mass
actions against people of Japanese ancestry were unnecessary for
military purposes and racially motivated. The United States
Supreme Court had affirmed Hirabayashi’s curfew conviction in
1943 in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). A year
later, in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the
Court upheld the forced exclusion of citizens of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast on grounds of military emergency. In its
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function to the very best of our abilities. It
is in that way that the independence of the
judiciary can best be maintained.
Procter Hug, Jr., is a
senior judge on the
United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. At the time he
took senior status on
January 1, 2002, he had
served on the Ninth
Circuit for 24 years, which ranked third
among the longest-serving active circuit
judges in the nation. Hug served as chief
judge of the Ninth Circuit from 1996 to
2000. A 1958 graduate of Stanford Law
School, he was appointed to the Ninth
Circuit in 1977 by President Carter. Judge
Hug’s chambers are in Reno, Nevada.

1987 decision vacating Hirabayashi’s conviction, the Ninth
Circuit found that the United States Supreme Court would not
have ruled as it did in Hirabayashi and Korematsu had it been
advised of the full record as it had been developed in succeeding
decades by archival historians. The United States did not seek
review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision by the United States
Supreme Court. As of 1987, according to the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion, Hirabayashi, an American citizen who had been born in
Seattle, Washington, in 1918, was a professor emeritus of sociol-

On the Importance of
Suggestibility Research in
Assessing the Credibility of
Children’s Testimony
David A. Martindale

I

n the spring of 1999, Professor Thomas Lyon of the University
of Southern California Law School published a lengthy law
review article in which he argued that the introduction into
evidence of research on the suggestibility of child witnesses was
not of assistance to triers of fact.1 Lyon’s article has found its way
into judicial training packets and has been posted to electronic
bulletin boards sponsored by organizations with interest in custody evaluations, psychology and law, and related topics. Because
judges are soon likely to encounter arguments based upon Lyon’s
article, I wish to alert judges to what I believe to be significant
fallacies in his critique of children’s suggestibility research.
Lyon is critical of what he refers to as the “new wave in children’s suggestibility research.” As the term is used by Lyon, the
new wave refers to a body of research conducted by Stephen
Ceci, Maggie Bruck, and others.2 It is my contention that the
new-wave research has added much to our earlier understanding
of memory processes. The professional recognition that the newwave researchers have received suggests that the contribution
made by their work to our understanding of children’s suggestibility has been widely appreciated.
Although Stephen Ceci, the developmental psychology professor who has spearheaded research in this area, and law professor Richard Friedman have already responded to Lyon’s critique,3 my perspective on this matter is somewhat different and,
I believe, much like a judge’s might be. I am not a researcher—
rather, I am a “consumer” of research data. For 15 years, I have
been a court-appointed evaluator of comparative custodial suitability; in that capacity, I have encountered a significant number
of abuse allegations. Knowledge of the cognitive dynamics
demonstrated in the new-wave research has been helpful to me
on many occasions. It is for this reason that I believe it to be

Footnotes
1. Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children’s Suggestibility
Research: A Critique, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1004 (1999).
2. The new-wave research is represented in the following works:
Maggie Bruck, Stephen J. Ceci, & Helene Hembrooke, Reliability
and Credibility of Young Children’s Reports: From Research to Policy
and Practice, 53 AMER. PSYCHOL. 136 (1998); Stephen J. Ceci &
Maggie Bruck, The Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A Historical
Review and Synthesis, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 403 (1993); Stephen J.
Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Child Witnesses: Translating Research into
Policy, SOC. POL’Y REP., Fall 1993 at 1; STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE
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information of potential use to triers of fact.
Lyon’s primary criticisms are: (1) that the new-wave
researchers have overstated the frequency with which suggestive
questioning occurs and, in their proposals for methodological
changes, have failed to address the risk that abusers will be
acquitted; (2) that new-wave research conditions have failed to
replicate real-world phenomena closely enough, thereby making it unreasonable to presume that we have gained meaningful
knowledge of the real-world phenomena through the research
on their artificial analogues; (3) that Maggie Bruck in particular
has erred in statements made during testimony and that her
decision to offer didactic as opposed to case-specific testimony
is flawed; and, finally, (4) that jurors are already aware that children are suggestible and that testimony concerning the newwave research causes jurors to overestimate the probability that
testimony from a particular child witness has been distorted by
suggestive questioning.
HOW SERIOUS IS THE PROBLEM?

Though Lyon asserts in his opening that the new-wave
researchers assume that highly suggestive interviewing techniques are the norm, he later acknowledges that Ceci and Bruck
have alerted their readers to the possibility that materials
reviewed by them may not be representative. The various
researchers mentioned by Lyon are surely aware that where their
involvement has been sought it was because someone believed
that the interviews being brought to their attention were conducted improperly. There is no basis for suggesting either that
the researchers are unaware that they have been examining an
unrepresentative sample of interview transcripts or that they
have endeavored to conceal this fact from their readers.

BRUCK, JEOPARDY IN THE COURTROOM: A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF
CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY (1995); STEPHEN J. CECI & HELENE
HEMBROOKE, EXPERT WITNESSES IN CHILD ABUSE CASES: WHAT CAN
AND SHOULD BE SAID IN COURT (1998); Stephen J. Ceci, David F.
Ross, & Michael P. Toglia, Suggestibility in Children’s Memory:
Psycholegal Implications, 116 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 38
(1987); STEPHEN J. CECI, MICHAEL P. TOGLIA, & DAVID F. ROSS,
CHILDREN’S EYEWITNESS MEMORY (1987); JOHN DORIS, THE
SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN’S RECOLLECTIONS (1991); and,
Elizabeth F. Loftus & Graham M. Davies, Distortions in the
Memory of Children, 40 J. SOC. ISSUES 51 (1984).

As we contemplate the relative risks associated with different
interview techniques, we must be mindful of the fact that some
of the emotional distress experienced by children involved in
sexual-abuse investigations is attributable to the methods we
employ in the course of our interactions with them. It is, I
believe, recognized that some children are unable to ascertain
the difference between events that have actually occurred and
events about which they have been involved in detailed discussions. It is, therefore, likely that in our well-intentioned (but
sometimes incompetent) attempts to protect children, we have
left some nonabused children with memories of abuse that, in
fact, never occurred.
Unfortunately, there is no foundation for the sanguine view
held by some that the practitioners whose tactics have been discredited in highly publicized cases represent a small minority of
the mental health professionals who have become involved in
evaluating children believed to have been the victims of sexual
abuse. In a study of appellate court decisions handed down in
sex-abuse cases between 1980 and 1990, it was found that 46% of
the interviewing experts had been treating the child who was the
focus of the case.4 Within the mental-health professions there is
general agreement that the performance of each activity (conducting therapy and conducting a forensic assessment for the
purpose of formulating an objective professional opinion with
respect to abuse) compromises one’s effectiveness in the performance of the other activity.5 The presence among the testifying
experts of so many treating practitioners suggests that many of
the mental-health professionals who have been performing investigations of alleged sexual abuse are not among those who are
familiar with generally accepted standards of practice.
IS THE NEW-WAVE RESEARCH APPLICABLE TO
REAL-WORLD CASES?

An assessment of the applicability of research to a particular
case must be based upon the amount of overlap between the
characteristics of the situations created by researchers and the
characteristics of the real-world situation that is the focus of the
case. To borrow from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,6 vigorous cross-examination
and the introduction into evidence of opposing views are the
traditional means by which to address such issues.
It is Lyon’s position that if children are suggestible, they are
also counter-suggestible and that false allegations arising from
leading questions can be ferreted out through effective crossexamination. He cites data from a study in which an attempt
was made to convince three and four year olds that they had
witnessed the theft of money from a purse. According to Lyon,
under cross-examination only one of the five children maintained that he had witnessed the theft. This finding does not

3. Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of
Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 33 (2000).
4. Mary Ann Mason, A Judicial Dilemma: Expert Witness Testimony in
Child Sex Abuse Cases, J. PSYCHIAT. & LAW, Fall/Winter 1991 at 185.
5. Stuart A. Greenberg & Daniel W. Shuman, Irreconcilable Conflict
between Therapeutic and Forensic Roles, 28 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. &
PRACTICE 1 (1997).
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interviewing is a tactic the consequences of which are minimal.
there is no
Few would argue that some
foundation for
very serious errors have been
the sanguine
made in some high-profile cases.
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In discussions of the new-wave
research and its applicability, the practitioners
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Jersey Supreme Court declared
minority . . . .
that no amount of cross-examination could have undone the harm
caused by Treacy’s interviews.
Lyon implies that cases like the Michaels case are to unpublicized evaluations as airplane crashes are to routine air travel. He
seems to suggest that, for that reason, our energy is misdirected
when we scrutinize such cases. While I acknowledge my lack of
expertise in the area of flight safety, it is my impression that in
its examination of disasters, the NTSB frequently uncovers problems the solutions to which make day-to-day air travel relatively
uneventful, as we wish it to be.
IS MAGGIE BRUCK DOING IT RIGHT?

Lyon has faulted Bruck for offering didactic testimony without familiarizing herself with case-specific details and has criticized her testimony in two particular cases. The offering of
expert testimony intended to educate triers of fact concerning
phenomena with which they may be insufficiently knowledgeable is generally considered to be among the most useful of the
types of testimony offered by mental-health professionals. Such
testimony provides a context within which evidence can be evaluated. The applicability of the anticipated framework testimony
can be considered in pretrial proceedings, can be alluded to in a
judge’s instructions to a jury, and can be contemplated by the
jurors. Though Lyon suggests that Bruck’s desire to simply function as an educator is inappropriate, many seasoned experts
would endorse her position. Immersing oneself in case-specific
details can compromise one’s objectivity.
Though experts are reasonably expected to be effective communicators, an analysis of an expert’s testimony provides more
information about the expert’s performance under pressure than
it does about the expert’s findings, theories, and conclusions.

6. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7. 625 A.2d 489 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 642 A.2d.
1372 (N.J. 1994).
8. Maggie Bruck & Stephen J. Ceci, Amicus Brief for the Case of State
of New Jersey v. Michaels Presented by Committee of Concerned
Social Scientists, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 272 (1995).
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When we prepare our thoughts for publication, we choose our
words with care: we have ample time in which to review and
contemplate what we have written; we are able to obtain input
from respected colleagues; and, when our words appear in print,
we are not required to disclose how many drafts we discarded.
When offering testimony, the situation, as we are all well aware,
is quite different. An accurate picture of a researcher’s position
with respect to her own work or the work of others is better
obtained by examining the researcher’s writings than by reviewing transcripts of her testimony in the course of an emotionally
charged trial.
TESTIMONY CONCERNING NEW-WAVE RESEARCH:
PREJUDICIAL OR PROBATIVE?

Ascertaining what evidence has been critical in juror decision
making is not as simple as it might appear. Even if we presume
that jurors endeavor to be forthright when responding to
inquiries concerning the manner in which they arrived at their
decisions, the best they can do is share with us those aspects of
their decision making of which they are aware. Even among
trained professionals, decision making can be influenced by factors of which we are not consciously aware.9
Even undisputed facts can, under certain circumstances, be
more prejudicial than probative. Lyon correctly calls attention
to the fact that when asked to estimate the frequency with
which an event occurs, individuals conduct a mental search for
instances of that event. Our estimate of the frequency is strongly
influenced by the number of and/or the impact of examples that
come to mind. To illustrate, ever since the May 1979 disappearance of Etan Patz on his first unaccompanied two-block walk
from home to school, child abduction has received widespread
publicity. It is likely that people asked to quantify various risks
to the health and well-being of children would overestimate the
incidence of abduction—particularly by strangers.
In an apparent endeavor to minimize the importance of suggestive interviewing techniques, Lyon cites studies from which
the data indicate that approximately 10% of interviewers’ questions are suggestive. The deleterious effect of one strong suggestion from an authoritative source is not likely to be diminished simply because it is followed by numerous non-suggestive
questions. Thus, we should endeavor to ascertain the percentage
of interviews that are undistorted by any suggestive questions.
That figure would have more meaning.
It has been well established that a proffer of evidence must be
accompanied by confirmation of its authenticity. It must be
shown that it is what it is presented as being. If the prosecution
wishes to introduce testimony concerning what is purported to
be a memory of an actual event, the defense should be afforded
the opportunity to question the authenticity of the memory.
SHOULD NEW-WAVE RESEARCH GUIDE
POLICY MAKING?

Lyon argues that we should not permit our concern with
regard to tactics such as those of Eileen Treacy to influence pol-

icy decisions that might set standards for all child interviews. As
we consider whether or not we should permit our discomfort
concerning one evaluator’s actions in one case to influence policy decisions, we should bear in mind that the Michaels case was
neither Eileen Treacy’s first case nor was it her last. Treacy functioned as the state’s expert in many uncomplicated cases that
were adjudicated without fanfare and without offsetting expert
testimony concerning the new-wave research. It would be naive
to presume that the methods employed by her in the Michaels
case were unique to that case.
Lyon suggests that investigators must move beyond openended questions when asking young children about possible
abuse because of the powerful disincentives to disclosure.
Accused felons, when being interrogated by police, are strongly
motivated not to confess. Should we, therefore, accept the use
by police officers of coercive tactics when they are confident that
the individual being questioned is guilty?
Lyon opines that the interview strategy changes suggested by
the new-wave researchers would hamper the detection of true
cases of abuse. Those who share Lyon’s concern might consider
the arguments that were mounted against Miranda warnings.
There was widespread concern that advising individuals of their
rights prior to questioning them would alter the interrogation
process in such a way as to make it more difficult to gather evidence, secure indictments, and prosecute wrongdoers. We have
lived with the terms of the Miranda decision since 1966 and I
believe it safe to say that our country is comfortable with the
concept.
While accepting the validity of one of Lyon’s concerns (that
testimony concerning the new-wave research may cause juror’s
to overestimate its importance in evaluating the testimony of a
particular child witness), it remains my strongly held view that
the probative value of such testimony far outweighs any prejudicial effect that it might cause.

David A. Martindale, Ph.D., holds a diploma in
forensic psychology from the American Board of
Professional Psychology. He is an adjunct clinical professor of psychiatry at the State
University of New York at Stony Brook and an
adjunct clinical supervisor at the John Jay
College of Criminal Justice of the City University
of New York. Dr. Martindale lectures regularly
for the American Academy of Forensic Psychology on the topic of
evaluating custodial fitness and is the senior author of Providing
Expert Testimony in Child Custody Litigation, a chapter in the
1991 edition of the Innovations in Clinical Practice series published by Professional Resource Exchange. His practice is limited to
consulting with psychologists and attorneys with respect to custody
matters. He can be contacted at david.martindale@worldnet.att.net.

9. Randy Borum, Randy K. Otto, & Stephen Golding, Improving Clinical
Judgment and Decision Making in Forensic Evaluation, 21 J. PSYCHIAT. &
LAW 35 (1993).

10 Court Review - Fall 2001

Let’s Not Exaggerate the
Suggestibility of Children
Thomas D. Lyon

I

’m grateful to Dr. Martindale for introducing the reader to an
important and lively debate among practitioners and academics over the relevance of recent research on children’s suggestibility. In my Cornell Law Review article, I argued that the
recent research on suggestibility was inspired by highly coercive interviewing techniques in widely publicized cases that
are not the norm in child sexual abuse investigations. These
techniques include telling children that they have been abused,
telling children that a particular person is the abuser, and asking children to imagine details regarding how abuse could have
taken place. Moreover, I argued that the research fails to mirror factors in real-world sexual-abuse cases that reduce the
likelihood that false allegations will occur. These factors
include the age of the child, children’s reluctance to accuse
loved ones of immoral acts, and children’s embarrassment
regarding sexual topics.
My goal was to alert judges, attorneys, and child-abuse professionals to the importance of carefully examining the methods used by researchers before concluding that research applies
to a particular case. Certainly there are cases in which highly
coercive tactics have been used, and in which expert testimony
on the dangers of such tactics is justified. But it is just as certain that the “suggestibility defense” will be overutilized.
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

When expert testimony on the suggestibility of children is
offered, the court must consider whether the research the
expert will discuss sufficiently fits the facts of the case to be
helpful to the jury.1 Jurors are likely to be influenced by expert
testimony even if it fails to fit the facts of the case, in part
because they are less adept at detecting a lack of fit, and in part
because they naturally assume that an expert testifying for the
defense is sympathetic to the defense.2 Moreover, unlike cases
involving adult eyewitnesses, most jurors come to court ready
to doubt the reliability of a child witness.3
The need for screening potentially unhelpful and prejudicial expert testimony is accentuated when an expert knows little about the case in which he or she is testifying. As Dr.
Martindale notes, experts routinely testify without familiarizing themselves with case-specific details, in order to retain
objectivity. Moreover, experts will almost inevitably make

Footnotes
1. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 702.
2. See M.B. Kovera, A.W. Gresham, E. Borgida, E. Gray & P.C.
Regan, Does Expert Psychological Testimony Inform or Influence
Juror Decision Making? A Social Cognitive Analysis, 82 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 178 (1997).
3. See, e.g., David F. Ross et al., Age Stereotypes, Communication

12 Court Review - Fall 2001

claims on the stand that they would be hesitant to make were
their words subject to peer review and publication: as Dr.
Martindale argues, “an analysis of an expert’s testimony provides more information about the expert’s performance under
pressure than it does about the expert’s findings.” The judge
must therefore scrutinize the applicability of the expert’s findings before the expert is allowed to take the stand. If the expert
is allowed to testify, the court should limit his or her discussion to research that applies to the case at bar.
WHAT ARE THE RESEARCH FINDINGS?

Dr. Martindale defends the applicability of the research to
real-world abuse cases and the relevance of expert testimony
on suggestibility without describing any of the research itself.
In the hands of a less conscientious expert than Dr. Martindale,
this argument can lead to mischief. Testifying experts will
often make blanket claims about the unreliability of children,
or report the results of research without describing the
methodology or the potential limits of the research’s applicability to the real world.
Let’s consider one of the most oft-cited studies demonstrating the suggestibility of children—the Sam Stone study, which
was published in Developmental Psychology, a peer-reviewed
scientific journal of the American Psychological Association.4
The study showed that a combination of suggestive interviewing techniques led 72% of younger children to assert falsely
that a stranger named Sam Stone had come to their preschool
and committed various misdeeds. Children often embellished
their false stories with perceptual details and nonverbal gestures, making their reports highly credible. Experts often cite
the study as evidence that children can be led to make false yet
highly convincing allegations of sexual abuse.
Closer examination reveals the lengths to which the
researchers worked to obtain false reports, and the extent to
which false allegations of sexual abuse are less likely in the real
world. One of the suggestive techniques the researchers used
was “stereotype induction,” which they analogized to negative
statements that adults might make about an ex-spouse.
Research assistants visited each child on four consecutive
weeks before Sam Stone came to the preschool, and provided
the child with details of 12 different misdeeds that the assis-

Modality, and Mock Jurors’ Perceptions of the Child Witness, in
PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY 37 (Stephen J. Ceci et al.,
eds., 1989).
4. Michelle D. Leichtman & Stephen J. Ceci, The Effects of
Stereotypes and Suggestions on Preschoolers’ Reports, 31
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 568 (1995).

tants had purportedly witnessed Sam perform. Sam Stone’s
visit was two minutes long, and he did not interact with individual children. Another suggestive technique the researchers
used was suggestive questioning. For four weeks after Sam’s
visit, an interviewer questioned each child each week. In the
first interview, the interviewer showed the child a soiled teddy
bear and a ripped book and asked the child to speculate who
might have done it. In the next three interviews the interviewer asked a series of highly suggestive questions. These
questions presupposed that Sam Stone had ripped the book or
soiled the teddy bear, did not give the child an opportunity to
deny that he had done so, and asked the child to choose among
details of the fictitious events. For example, “Did Sam Stone
rip the book with his hands, or did he use scissors?” “When
Sam Stone got the bear dirty, did he do it by accident, or on
purpose?” These questions were asked regardless of whether
the child affirmed or denied that Sam Stone had performed any
misdeeds. Ten weeks later, all children were interviewed in a
nonleading fashion. At that time, 72% of the three and four
year olds implicated Sam in one or both misdeeds.
The high rates of false reports are impressive. But equally
impressive are other details of the study that are often overlooked. First, the authors report “dramatic developmental
trends” in children’s susceptibility to the suggestive techniques.5 The rate of false reports among the older preschoolers, who were five to six years of age, was about half of that of
the younger children. School-age children would be even less
likely to succumb to the interviewer’s pressures. One of the
most consistent findings in the suggestibility literature is that
preschool children are particularly vulnerable to suggestive
questioning, and preschool children predominate in recent
research documenting the unreliability of children’s testimony.
Second, the study was unusual in that the final interview
contained two questions mildly skeptical of the children’s
claims. Asking children if they saw the events reduced the
number of false reports by about half. Asking the children,
“You didn’t really see him rip the book (or soil the bear), did
you?” cut the number by half again. Having been exposed to
four trials of stereotype induction and three trials of suggestive
questioning, 21% of the three and four year olds (and only 5%
of the five and six year olds) maintained that the misdeeds had
occurred.
Dr. Martindale might respond that he is not reassured by
these numbers, and I would agree that any false allegation of
sexual abuse is devastating, not only for the accused, but also
for the child and his or her family. Yet these percentages exaggerate the likelihood that a child will accuse a familiar adult of
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there are large age differences in suggestibility. I am struck by how many experts appear
to overlook the truism that just as preschoolers are much more
suggestible than school-age children, school-age children are
much less suggestible than preschoolers. Second, children are
both suggestible and counter-suggestible. Researchers often fail
to test the persistence of their suggestions; Sam Stone is an
exception, and dramatically reduced the number of false reports.
Third, much of the suggestibility research elicits false narratives
from young children by telling them that the events occurred (as
opposed to merely asking them), and by providing them with
details with which they can imagine the events. Indeed, these
are the techniques researchers have used to create substantial
numbers of false childhood memories in adults. But the issue
is not whether children can be led to make false allegations, but
whether they are being led by current investigative methods.

5. Id. at 568.
6. Id. at 569.
7. See, e.g., Amye R. Warren et al., “It Sounds Good in Theory, But....”
Do Investigative Interviewers Follow Guidelines Based on Memory
Research?, 1 CHILD MALTREATMENT 231 (1996). Michael Lamb,
Kathleen Sternberg, and collegues at the National Institute of
Child Health and Development have conducted a number of studies demonstrating how interviewers tend to ask closed-ended
rather than open-ended questions. For one of the most recent
examples, see Kathleen J. Sternberg, Michael E. Lamb, Graham M.

Davies, & Helen L. Westcott, The Memorandum of Good Practice:
Theory Versus Application, 25 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 669 (2001).
8. See Maggie Bruck, Stephen J. Ceci, & Helene Hembrooke,
Reliability and Credibility of Young Children’s Reports: From
Research to Policy and Practice, 53 AM. PSYCHOL. 136, 139 (noting
increase in suggestibility as one moves from yes/no questions to
questions that presuppose the truth of the suggested information,
e.g., “Is there a cabinet in the room?” to “Isn’t there a cabinet in
the room?” to “Is the door open in the cabinet in the room?”).

WHAT SORT OF INTERVIEWS ARE OCCURRING IN THE
REAL WORLD?

Leichtman and Ceci asserted that the techniques in the Sam
Stone study were based on “real-world forensic conditions.”6
In my 1999 paper, I questioned the applicability of the Sam
Stone study and other studies to the real world, pointing out
that the research on actual interviews had not documented the
widespread use of techniques such as stereotype induction.
What had been documented was that interviewers were asking
very few open-ended questions, and relying heavily on closedended questions (yes-no questions and forced-choice questions).7 Closed-ended questions are often considered “leading,” and I believe they are being overused. In my presentations to child interviewers, I emphasize the need for structured
interview protocols and the potential benefits of rapport building and greater use of open-ended questions as means of
increasing information without reducing reliability. All the
same, closed-ended questions are far less leading than the
kind of questions asked in studies like Sam Stone.8 They are
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less offensive than many of the techniques documented in the
notorious day-care cases like Kelly Michaels and the McMartin
case. Closed-ended questions are also necessary in some
cases.9 Abused children are often quite reluctant to describe
abuse that was painful, shameful, and embarrassing.10
After my article appeared, Amye Warren and her colleagues
set out to test my claims on a sample of 42 child abuse interviews conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Their conclusion? “We believe that our results regarding the frequency of
problematic techniques in ‘typical’ child sexual abuse interviews are encouraging. It appears that the assumptions made
by Lyon (1999) about the rarity of some of the most egregious
interviewing practices (e.g. referring to what other people have
said) in ‘typical’ interviews may be well-founded.”11 The
authors issued several caveats: the interviews might not be representative of all interviews, and the researchers might have
both missed some suggestive techniques, and counted some
harmless interactions as suggestive.12 Most importantly, the
authors stressed that the infrequent use of improper techniques
does not make an interview a good interview. Nevertheless, the
study supported my basic assertion: studies like Sam Stone
exaggerate the suggestiveness of real-world interviews.
In response to the relative infrequency of the highly suggestive techniques favored by suggestibility researchers, Dr.
Martindale argues that the “deleterious effect of one strong
suggestion from an authoritative source is not likely to be
diminished simply because it is followed by numerous nonsuggestive questions.” I know of no research to support this
assertion, and Dr. Martindale does not offer any. The recent
research on preschool children’s suggestibility does not stop
with “one strong suggestion.” It is the dogged persistence of
coercive interviewers that reliably produces false narratives in
young children. The cases that inspired the research involved
unrelenting suggestion over long periods of time by interviewers utterly convinced that abuse had occurred. The mistakes
committed by investigative interviewers in less sensational
cases tend to be much more mundane.
We clearly need to improve the quality of interviewing: we
should provide more training, more supervision, and more
resources. But the liberal receipt of expert testimony on the
effects of highly suggestive interviewing techniques on
preschool children is more likely to simply increase the number of acquittals across the board than to improve interviewing
practice.
CONCLUSION

I agree with Dr. Martindale that the recent research on children’s suggestibility has done a lot of good. It has spawned

9. See Stephen J. Ceci and Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of
Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 33, 46 (2000) (“There is no serious doubt that directed questioning will often be far more effective than requests for free recall
in securing disclosure of abuse.”).
10. See Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children’s Suggestibility
Research: A Critique, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1004, 1046 (1999).
11. Amye R. Warren, Sena Garven, Nancy E. Walker, & Cara E.
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several research programs aimed at improving the process by
which children are interviewed about abuse. In appropriate
cases, it can educate judges and jurors about the dangers of
highly suggestive interviewing with young children. It has
largely silenced extremist claims that children’s abuse allegations are never false or that children are no more suggestible
than adults.
However, we must not forget that the extremist claims were
founded on overgenerous interpretations of research finding
surprisingly low rates of false reports among young children.
Research highlighting high rates of error can easily lead to similarly unfounded claims about children’s reliability. These
claims, in turn, can reinforce commonsense doubts about children’s reliability and inherent reluctance to confront child sexual abuse.
The solution is quite straightforward: judges must take care
to assess the applicability of suggestibility research on a caseby-case basis. Experts seeking to testify must describe the
research with sufficient specificity to allow the court to assess
whether the research fits the fact of the case. If it doesn’t fit,
you don’t admit. Similarly, suggestibility research offered for
other purposes (such as for assessing the reliability of hearsay)
should be scrutinized with similar care. Judges should keep in
mind the importance of the child’s age, the suggestive influences at issue, and the relationship of the child to the alleged
offender. Through judicious gatekeeping, extremist claims
about suggestibility can be kept out of the courtroom.
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Recent Civil Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court:
The 2000-2001 Term
Charles H. Whitebread

T

he Supreme Court’s role in the 2000 presidential election
sparked intense national debate and will be the sole decision for which this term will be remembered. Although no
other decisions rose to same level of political or popular significance, the Court confronted various civil-law topics of particular
interest. Among them were issues concerning immigrant rights,
interpretation of significant statutes such as the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and important matters regarding the First
Amendment and federalism.1

ELECTIONS

On November 8, 2000, the Florida Division of Elections
reported that George W. Bush won the preceding day’s presidential election, defeating Al Gore by a margin of victory that was
less than one-half of a percent of the votes cast. Pursuant to
Florida’s election code, an automatic machine recount was subsequently carried out. The recount indicated that Bush was still
the victor, though by an even smaller margin. Al Gore then
requested manual recounts in four Florida counties. After a dispute arose between Florida’s secretary of state and the Florida
Supreme Court over the deadline for the submission of the
recounted votes, the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board2 vacated the Florida Supreme
Court’s imposed deadline due to the “considerable uncertainty as
to the grounds on which it was based.” The Florida Supreme
Court reinstated its deadline of November 26, at which time
Bush was declared the winner of Florida’s 25 electoral votes
based on the certified recount results. Gore contested the certification relying on the Federal election code, “which provides
that ‘receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number
of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of
the election’ shall be grounds for a contest.”
The Florida Supreme Court defined a “legal vote” as one that
provides a “clear indication of the intent of the voter.” The
Florida Supreme Court recognized 9,000 ballots from MiamiDade County alone that had failed to detect a vote for president.
Because these “undervotes” were “sufficient to place the results
of the election in doubt,” the Florida Supreme Court ordered an
immediate manual recount “in all Florida counties where socalled ‘undervotes’ had not been subject to manual tabulation”
and also ordered the inclusion of votes for Gore that failed to
meet the November deadline. In Bush v. Gore,3 the 5-4 per curiam
decision of the United States Supreme Court held that the

1. For a more in-depth review of the decisions of the past term, see
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, RECENT DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, 2000-2001 (Amer. Acad. Jud. Educ. 2001).
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Florida Supreme Court’s order for a statewide, manual recount of
the presidential election ballots violated the Equal Protection
Clause absent specified procedural standards. The Court
explained that though considering the “intent of the voter” from
ballot cards “is unobjectionable” in the abstract, the recount procedure in this case, which had no specific and uniform standard
of interpretation to be used throughout the Florida counties, “is
not a process with sufficient guarantees of equal protection.” It
emphasized, “When a court orders a statewide remedy, there
must be at least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied.”
However, the Court held that inclusion of vote counts resulting
from standards of interpretation that vary in each county does
not satisfy these requirements. In conclusion, the Court referred
to 3 U.S.C. section 5’s requirement “that any controversy or contest that is designed to lead to a conclusive selection of electors
be completed by December 12.” Since the Court delivered its
opinion on that date, and there were no recount procedures in
place that could meet the requisite constitutional standards, “any
recount seeking to meet the December 12 date will be unconstitutional” and therefore the Court vacated the recount order, thus
bringing the election to an end.
In Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion, he stressed
several additional grounds for reversing the Florida Supreme
Court’s decision. One reason he suggested was that the Florida
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal election code
“impermissibly distorted” Florida’s “detailed if not perfectly
crafted statutory scheme” for appointing presidential electors by
“frustrat[ing] the legislative desire to attain the ‘safe harbor’ provided by § 5.” Ultimately, he concluded that the Florida Supreme
Court’s order to recount “tens of thousands of so-called ‘undervotes’” four days before the December 12 deadline was not an
“appropriate” remedy as authorized by the Florida legislature
because it “could not possibly be completed by that date.”
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion because he did not
believe that the Florida Supreme Court’s failure “to specify in
detail the precise manner in which the ‘intent of the voter’. . . is
to be determined rises to the level of a constitutional violation.”
He suggested that the Court’s decision was based instead on “an
unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity of
the state judges.” He concluded, “Although we may never know
with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s
Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It

2. 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
3. 531 U.W. 98 525 (2000).

is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian
of the rule of law.”
Justice Souter dissented because he disagreed with the Court’s
decision to stop the recount and instead believed the “political
tension could have worked itself out in the Congress following
the procedure provided in 3 U.S.C. § 15.” Also, he saw “no warrant for this Court to assume that Florida could not possibly
comply with [equal protection] requirement[s] before the date
set for the meeting of electors, December 18.”
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg criticized the Court for its
intervention into the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of
its own state’s law. She asserted that the “core of federalism” is
the principle that “Federal courts defer to state high courts’ interpretations of their state’s own law.” She also suggested that even
if there were an equal protection violation, “the Court’s conclusion that a constitutionally adequate recount is impractical is a
prophecy the Court’s own judgment will not allow to be tested.”
In Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion, he asserted that “there
is no justification for the majority’s remedy, which is simply to
reverse the lower court and halt the recount entirely.” He also
suggested that the federal claims, if any, could have been fixed on
remand. Though a constitutional recount could not take place
by December 12, he concluded that it should be up to the state
courts to determine whether one could be conducted before the
electors were scheduled to meet on December 18. He ultimately
disagreed with the Court’s role in resolving the dispute because
“Congress is the body primarily authorized to resolve [such] disputes.” He suggested, “Congress, being a political body,
expresses the people’s will far more accurately than does an
unelected Court.” He concluded by expressing his apprehension
that “in this highly politicized matter, the appearance of a split
decision runs the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in
the Court itself.”
IMMIGRATION

In Zadvydas v. Davis,4 a divided Court held that the
Constitution “does not permit indefinite detention” of
deportable aliens, but “limits an alien’s post-removal-period
detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that
alien’s removal from the United States,” even if the government
is unable to find a recipient country. The detention statute states
that if an alien falls within a certain statutory category, then that
alien “may be detained beyond the removal period and, if
released, shall be subject to [certain] terms of supervision.”
Despite the fact that there is “no ‘limit on the length of time
beyond the removal period that [such] an alien . . . may be
detained,’” the Court “read an implicit limitation into the
statute.” Though the statute uses the discretionary term “may,”
the Court said that did “not necessarily suggest unlimited discretion.” It continued, “[I]f Congress had meant to authorize
long-term detention of unremovable aliens, it certainly could
have spoken in clearer terms.” The Court emphasized that “once
an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for
the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United

4. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
5. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).

States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” The Court considered it
“practically necessary to recognize some presumptively reasonable period of detention.” Therefore, it instructed, “After [a] 6month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” In his dissent, Justice
Kennedy complained that the Court’s imputation of an “implied,
nontextual limitation . . . has no basis in the language or structure of the [statute] and in fact contradicts and defeats the purpose set forth in the express terms of the statutory text.” He also
explained, “When an alien is removable, he or she has no right
under the basic immigration laws to remain in this country,”
because “[a]n alien’s admission to this country is conditioned
upon compliance with our laws, and removal is the consequence
of a breach of that understanding.”
Justice Stevens, writing for a divided Court in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr,5 held that federal courts have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 2241 to review a deportable
alien’s challenge to deportation policies. Also, the Court held
that the Attorney General’s discretionary relief to waive deportation of eligible aliens, granted by section 212(c) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, remains available to
aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements
and who would have been eligible for waiver prior to the effective dates of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Those statutes have been interpreted to withdraw his discretion to grant waivers of deportation.
Regarding federal courts’ review jurisdiction, the Court stated
that the INS’s interpretation of these statutes “would entirely preclude review of a pure question of law by any court . . . [and
thus] give rise to substantial constitutional questions.” The
Court agreed with the Second Circuit’s holding that Congress’s
intentions “are ambiguous and that the statute imposes an
impermissible retroactive effect on aliens who, in reliance on the
possibility of § 212(c) relief, pled guilty to aggravated felonies.”
“Finally,” he wrote, “the fact that § 212(c) relief is discretionary
does not affect the propriety of our conclusion [because t]here is
a clear difference . . . between facing possible deportation and
facing certain deportation.”
In another 5-4 decision, the Court in Nguyen v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service6 held that an immigration law that
establishes different citizenship rules for children born out of
wedlock depending on whether the citizen parent is the mother
or father is consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of
equal protection. The disputed statutory provision requires “one
of three affirmative steps . . . be taken if the citizen parent is the
father, but not if the citizen parent is the mother.” The Court
stated that this decision by Congress “is based on the significant
difference between [the parents’] respective relationships to the
potential citizen at the time of birth.” The Court advised that
even a “facially neutral rule would sometimes require fathers to

6. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
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take additional affirmative steps which would not be required of
mothers.” Moreover, “Just as neutral terms can mask discrimination that is unlawful, gender specific terms can mark a permissible distinction.” The Court concluded that “the [statute’s]
use of gender specific terms takes into account a biological difference between the parents.” It also cautioned, “Mechanistic
classification of all our differences as stereotypes would operate
to obscure those misconceptions and prejudices that are real.”
Justice O’Connor condemned the manner in which the Court
explained and applied the heightened scrutiny standard appropriate to legislative classifications based on sex. Though she
agreed that “the failure to recognize relevant differences is out of
line with the command of equal protection,” she argued that “so
too do we undermine the promise of equal protection when we
try to make our differences carry weight they simply cannot
bear.”

Justice Thomas, writing for the Court in Good News Club v.
Milford Central School,7 held that the exclusion of a religious
club’s access to a school’s limited public forum is impermissible
viewpoint discrimination in violation of the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment. A public school enacted a community
use policy designating appropriate purposes for which residents
may use its building after school. Among the permissible purposes were uses for “social, civic and recreational meetings and
entertainment events, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of
the community, provided that such uses shall be nonexclusive
and shall be opened to the general public.” However, when the
Good News Club, a Christian organization for children,
requested permission to hold weekly after-school meetings in the
school cafeteria, it was denied because its activities “were not a
discussion of secular subjects such as child rearing, development
of character and development of morals from a religious perspective, but were in fact the equivalent of religious instruction
itself.” The Court, however, asserted that “it is clear that the club
teaches morals and character development to children . . . even
if it does so in a nonsecular way.” The Court also “disagree[d]
that something that is ‘quintessentially religious’ or ‘decidedly
religious in nature’ cannot also be characterized properly as the
teaching of morals and character development from a particular
viewpoint.” Instead, the Court said “we can see no logical difference in kind between the invocation of Christianity by the
Club and the invocation of teamwork, loyalty, or patriotism by
other associations to provide a foundation for their lessons.” In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens asserted, “School officials
may reasonably believe that evangelical meetings designed to
convert children to a particular religious faith” may well “introduce divisiveness and tend to separate young children into
cliques that undermine the school’s educational mission.”
Justice Souter also dissented criticizing the Court’s holding,
which he cautioned could potentially “stand for the remarkable
proposition that any public school opened for civic meetings
must be opened for use as a church, synagogue, or mosque.”
In United States v. United Foods, Inc.,8 the Court held that

mandatory assessments used to fund generic mushroom advertisements violate the First Amendment right against compelled
speech. In doing so, the Court declined to rethink the relative
position of commercial speech in the free speech hierarchy. The
Court observed that United Foods, Inc. “wants to convey the
message that its brand of mushrooms is superior to those grown
by other producers,” but is forced to subsidize the message “that
mushrooms are worth consuming whether or not they are
branded,” which is “favored by a majority of producers.” The
Court distinguished this case from its prior decision in Glickman
v. Wileman Brothers & Elliot, Inc.,9 which allowed mandated
assessments for speech regarding the marketing of California tree
fruits. The Court points out that in that case, competition
among producers was displaced and they “were compelled to
contribute funds for use in cooperative advertising . . . ‘as part of
a broader collective enterprise in which their freedom to act
independently was already constrained by the regulatory
scheme.’” In the present case, however, the sole purpose for the
mandatory assessment was the “generic advertising” of mushrooms. Beyond this regulation, mushroom producers were not
similarly constrained in their freedom to act independently nor
were they bound by the statute to “associate as a group which
makes cooperative decisions.” The Court found this absence of
a “broader regulatory system” a “fundamental” difference that
required it to depart from Glickman. In Justice Breyer’s dissent,
he asserted that the Court’s reliance on the level of regulation was
inapposite and stated, “It is difficult to see why a Constitution
that seeks to protect individual freedom would consider the
absence of ‘heavy regulation’ . . . to amount to a special, determinative reason for refusing to permit this less intrusive program.” He concluded that the Court “sets an unfortunate precedent” that will only be an incentive for heavier governmental regulation and restrictions.
In a 6-3 decision, the Court, in Bartnicki v. Vopper,10 held that
the First Amendment protects speech that discloses the content
of an illegally intercepted communication concerning a public
matter. Here, an unidentified person intercepted a conversation
between two representatives of a teachers union discussing bargaining negotiations with a school board. The conversation was
recorded and given to media representatives who ultimately published it. Federal and state wiretapping statutes prohibit the disclosure of communications that one “knew or had reason to
know” were illegally intercepted. The Court stated the statute’s
“naked prohibition against disclosures is fairly characterized as a
regulation of pure speech.” Though the statutes’ restrictions
intend to remove “the incentive for parties to intercept private
conversations, and . . . minimize[e] the harm to persons whose
conversations have been illegally intercepted,” the Court noted
that in this case the information disclosed was lawfully obtained
and concerned “a matter of public concern,” and the media representatives “played no part in the illegal interception.” Given
these facts, the Court concluded that “it by no means follows
that punishing disclosures [of this kind] is an acceptable means
of serving those ends.” Ultimately, the Court asserted, “privacy
concerns give way when balanced against the interest in pub-

7. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
8. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).

9. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
10. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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lishing matters of public importance.” The key to the Court’s
decision is the importance of the matter: the Court indicated that
it might not feel the same way if the intercepted conversation
concerned private gossip or personal matters.
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,11 a divided Court held that
a congressional funding condition on the Legal Services
Corporation that prohibited it from representing indigent clients
attempting to challenge or amend existing welfare law violates
the First Amendment. The Legal Services Corporation (LSC)
distributes funds to grantee organizations “for the purpose of
providing financial support for legal assistance in noncriminal
proceedings to persons financially unable to afford legal assistance.” Though indigent clients could challenge welfare determinations based on existing law, “grantees could not accept representations designed to change welfare laws, much less argue
against the constitutionality or statutory validity of those laws.”
The Court noted that here “the Government seeks to use an
existing medium of expression and to control it . . . in ways
which distort its usual functioning.” The Court asserted that the
government “may not design a subsidy to effect this serious and
fundamental restriction on advocacy of attorneys and the functioning of the judiciary.” The Court concluded that the statutory
condition impairs the authority of the judiciary to interpret law
and the Constitution because it prohibits “speech and expression
upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise of the
judicial power.” Furthermore, the Court explained that the
restriction is inconsistent with separation of powers principles
because it is used “to insulate the Government’s laws from judicial inquiry” by excluding “from litigation those arguments and
theories Congress finds unacceptable but which by their nature
are within the province of the courts to consider.”
In a 5-4 decision, the Court in Federal Election Commission v.
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee12 held that limitations on a political party’s independent expenditures violate
the First Amendment, but that limitations on the party’s spending when coordinated with a candidate are constitutional. The
Court explained that “limits on political expenditures deserve
closer scrutiny than restrictions on political contributions,”
because “[r]estraints on expenditures generally curb more
expressive and associational activity than limits on contributions
do.” The Court pointed out that it has “routinely struck down
limitations on independent expenditures by candidates, other
individuals, and groups, while repeatedly upholding contribution limits.” Moreover, “treating coordinated expenditures as
contributions ‘prevent[s] attempts to circumvent the [Federal
Election Campaign Act] through prearranged or coordinated
expenditures amounting to disguised contributions.” The Court
concluded, “There is no question about the closeness of candidates to parties and no doubt that the Act affected parties’ roles
and their exercise of power.” But “there is little evidence to suggest that coordinated party spending limits adopted by Congress
have frustrated the ability of political parties to exercise their
First Amendment rights to support their candidates.” The Court
considered the limitation on a party’s coordinated spending as

11. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
12. 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
13. 531 U.S. 288 (2001).

“‘closely drawn’ to match . . . the ‘sufficiently important’ government interest in combating political corruption.”
STATE ACTION

Justice Souter, writing for a divided Court in Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association,13 held
that a statewide athletic association’s regulatory activity may be
treated as state action due to the “pervasive entwinement” of
state school officials in its structure absent an offsetting reason to
consider the activity otherwise. A nonprofit membership association regulated interscholastic sport of its member schools, both
public and private, throughout Tennessee. However, public
schools made up 84% of the association’s membership. Also,
though the association’s officials are not paid by the state, they
are eligible for the state retirement system. The Court relied on
dictum in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian,14
which suggested “that statewide interscholastic athletic associations are state actors” if their “membership consisted entirely of
institutions located within the same state, many of them public
institutions.” The Court concluded that “to the extent of 84% of
its membership, the Association is an organization of public
schools represented by their officials acting in their official
capacity to provide an integral element of secondary public
schooling.” Demonstrating the “pervasive entwinement,” the
Court continued, “[t]here would be no recognizable Association,
legal or tangible, without the public school officials, who do not
merely control but overwhelmingly perform all but the purely
ministerial acts.” The Court recognized that other tests like the
“public function” or State “coercion” tests would not permit a
finding of state action. However, it said that “the implication of
state action is not affected by pointing out that the facts might
not loom as large under a different test.” In response to concerns
that a finding of state action here would “somehow trigger an
epidemic of unprecedented federal litigation,” the Court noted
that in the numerous jurisdictions that have already declared
“statewide athletic association[s] like the one here” to be state
actors, there has been “no evident wave of litigation.”
FEDERALISM

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for another divided Court in
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,15 held
that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court by state
employees seeking money damages from the state for its failure
to comply with Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). Title I of the ADA “prohibits certain employers, including the States, from ‘discriminat[ing in various ways] against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual.” It also requires employers to “mak[e] reasonable accommodations” unless they “would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the [employer’s] business.” The
Court explained, “The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh
Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.” The Court indicated that
Congress may use the ADA to abrogate this immunity pursuant

14. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
15. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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to a valid exercise of its enforcement power under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Also, the ADA “must exhibit ‘congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented
or remedied and the means adopted to that end.’” Identifying the
“scope of the constitutional right at issue,” the Court cited
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,16 which held that mental
retardation was not a “quasi-suspect” classification and legislation using such a classification was subject only to “rationalbasis” review. The Court concluded that “the result of Cleburne
is that States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to
make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their
actions towards such individuals are rational.” Pointing out that
the burden is on Congress to negate “any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification,” the Court determined that “[t]he legislative record of the
ADA . . . simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a
pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against
the disabled.” Furthermore, the Court concluded that despite
the ADA’s “undue hardship” exception, “the accommodation
duty far exceeds what is constitutionally required in that it
makes unlawful a range of alternate responses that would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing an ‘undue burden’ upon
the employer.” In Justice Breyer’s dissent, he asserted that
“Congress reasonably could have concluded that the remedy
before us constitutes an ‘appropriate’ way to enforce this basic
equal protection requirement. And that is all the Constitution
requires.”
In an 8-0 decision, the Court in United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative17 held that there is no medical
necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act’s prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing marijuana. Under the
Controlled Substances Act, marijuana is a “schedule I” drug,
which is the most restrictive of the five schedules designated in
the statute. Under this federal law, the only exception to its prohibition on the manufacture and distribution of such a drug is
government-approved research.
However, California’s
Compassionate Use Act of 1996 provided “seriously ill
Californians . . . the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes” upon the recommendation of a physician. Thus,
though the actions of organizations created to provide marijuana
to seriously ill Californians were legal under state law, they
remained in violation of federal law. The Court refused to add to
the federal statute an “implied exception” of medical necessity
even though “necessity was a defense at common law.” The
Court asserted that it “need only recognize that a medical necessity exception for marijuana is at odds with the terms of the
Controlled Substances Act[, . . . which] leave no doubt that the
defense is unavailable.” Ultimately, the Court noted that in the
present case Congress had made the determination that “marijuana has ‘no currently accepted medical use’ at all” and has classified it accordingly.
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,18 a divided Court held that
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) preempts Massachusetts’s regulations on outdoor and point-of-sale
cigarette advertising. However, all of the justices agreed that

those same regulations on smokeless tobacco and cigars violate
the First Amendment. Examining the FCLAA’s preemption provision, the Court explained that its “sweeping language” prohibited states from imposing restrictions “based on smoking and
health with respect to the advertising and promotion of cigarettes.” Though the Massachusetts regulations are aimed to “prevent access to such products by underage consumers,” the Court
concluded that “the concern about youth exposure to cigarette
advertising is intertwined with the concern about cigarette
smoking and health.” Despite the contention that the advertising regulations on cigarettes “fall squarely within the State’s traditional powers to control the location of advertising and to protect the welfare of children,” the Court asserted that this argument “cannot be squared with the language of the pre-emption
provision, which reaches all ‘requirements’ and ‘prohibitions’
imposed under state law.’” Also, it “cannot be reconciled with
Congress’ own location-based restriction, which bans advertising
in electronic media, but not elsewhere.” In support of its ruling
that the outdoor regulations on smokeless tobacco and cigars
violate the First Amendment, the Court asserted that
Massachusetts’s “Attorney General did not ‘carefully calculate the
costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed’
by the regulations,” which “unduly impinge on the [tobacco
retailers’] ability to propose a commercial transaction and the
adult listener’s opportunity to obtain information about
[tobacco] products.” Regarding the restrictions on indoor,
point-of-sale advertising, which prohibit tobacco advertisements
from being lower than five feet from the floor, the Court
explained, “The 5 foot rule does not seem to advance [the State’s
interest in preventing minors from using tobacco products]. Not
all children are less than 5 feet tall, and those who are certainly
have the ability to look up and take in their surroundings.”

16. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
17. 532 U.S. 483 (2001).

18. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
19. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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PROPERTY RIGHTS

In another 5-4 decision, the Court in Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island19 held that a claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment is ripe when a final decision is made regarding the
extent of permitted development on the property at issue. The
Court also held that the date of title transfer does not bar an individual from raising a takings claim. Anthony Palazzolo was the
sole shareholder of a corporation that owned the title to 20 acres
of land, most of which was considered “coastal wetlands” under
state law. Some time later, the Rhode Island Coastal Resource
Management Council promulgated regulations that were to
greatly limit development on “coastal wetlands” in Rhode Island.
After the promulgation of the regulations, title of the 20 acres
was transferred to Palazzolo. All proposals to develop on the
land, submitted by the corporation and Palazzolo, were denied
because their impact on the wetlands would conflict with the
regulation scheme. The Court explained that the final decision
requirement was adopted because whether a regulatory taking
has occurred “cannot be resolved in definitive terms until a court
knows ‘the extent of permitted development’ on the land in question.” Though the council claimed that the extent of permissible
development on the property was still in doubt, the Court dis-

agreed because the “extent of permissible development on petitioner’s wetlands” was identifiable given “the unequivocal nature
of the wetland regulations at issue and by the Council’s application of the regulations to the subject property.” Holding that
Palazzolo’s post-regulation acquisition of title was not fatal to his
claim, the Court rejected the State’s “sweeping rule” that pronounced “[a] purchaser or a successive title holder like petitioner is deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted restriction
and is barred from claiming that it effects a taking.” “Were we to
accept the State’s rule,” the Court concluded, “the postenactment
transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend
any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable,” thus allowing the state, “in effect, to put an expiration
date on the Takings Clause.”

In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers,20 a divided Court held that the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers’ extension of the definition of “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act (CWA) to include
intrastate waters used as a habitat by migratory birds exceeded
the authority granted by the Act. An association of Chicago
cities sought to develop a disposal site for nonhazardous solid
waste on a parcel of land that had been used for sand and gravel
pit mining until it was abandoned. The excavation trenches had
since become a “scattering of permanent and seasonal ponds of
varying size” on which a number of migratory birds have been
observed. Under section 404(a) of the CWA, the corps may regulate “navigable waters” defined as “the waters of the United
States, including territorial seas.” The corps clarified its jurisdictional reach by extending the definition of “navigable waters”
to include “intrastate waters . . . which are or would be used as
habitat by . . . migratory birds which cross state lines.” The
Court concluded, however, that this interpretation “is not fairly
supported by the CWA.” The Court recognized that in United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,21 it had extended the
corps’ jurisdiction under section 404(a) to wetlands adjacent to
a “navigable waterway,” noting “that the term ‘navigable’ is of
‘limited import’ and that Congress evidenced its intent to ‘regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed navigable
under the classical understanding.’” The Court found that decision “was based in large measure upon Congress’ unequivocal
acquiescence to, and approval of, the Corps’ regulations interpreting the CWA to cover wetlands . . . ‘inseparably bound up
with the ‘waters’ of the United States.’” The present case, however, lacks that “significant nexus between the wetlands and
‘navigable waters.’” Though Congress failed “to pass legislation
that would have overturned the corps’ 1977 regulations and the
extension of jurisdiction,” the Court explained that the failure to
pass legislation was insufficient to demonstrate that Congress
acquiesced to the corps’ expansive interpretation of section
404(a). The Court also refused to accept the corps’ interpretation because the expanded jurisdiction “would result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power
over land and water use.”

In a 5-4 decision, the Court in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams22 held that section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
confines an exemption from arbitration to employment contracts
of transportation workers. The Court noted that section 1 of the
FAA exempts from the statute’s coverage “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” The Court
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s construction of section 1, which reasoned that all employment contracts are excluded as “contracts
of employment of . . . any other class of workers engaged in . . .
commerce.” The Court explained that the phrase “any other
class of workers engaged in commerce” is “a residual phrase following . . . explicit reference to ‘seamen’ and ‘railroad employees.’” To construe it “to exclude all employment contracts fails
to give independent effect to the statute’s enumeration of the specific categories of workers which precedes it.” The Court also
rejected the argument that the use of “engaged in commerce”
was intended to invoke Congress’s commerce power to the full
extent because it has consistently reaffirmed the relatively limited scope of that phrase. The Court concluded its opinion by
endorsing the “real benefits to the enforcement of arbitration
provisions,” which include the avoidance of litigation costs to
parties and the courts.
Justice Scalia, writing for a divided Court in Alexander v.
Sandoval,23 held that there is no private right of action to enforce
disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act provides “that no person shall, ‘on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity’ covered by Title VI.” Federal agencies are authorized
under section 602 “to effectuate the provisions of [§ 601] . . . by
issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability.” The
Court explained that “private individuals may sue to enforce §
601 of Title VI and obtain both injunctive relief and damages.”
The Court “assume[s] for purposes of deciding this case that regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI may validly proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups,
even though such activities are permissible under § 601.” The
Court recognized “that regulations applying § 601’s ban on
intentional discrimination are covered by the cause of action to
enforce that section . . . [because] if valid and reasonable, [they]
authoritatively construe the statute itself.” Thus, there is no
need “to talk about a separate cause of action to enforce the regulations apart from the statute.” However, the Court indicated
that “the disparate-impact regulations do not simply apply §
601—since they indeed forbid conduct that § 601 permits—and
therefore [it is] clear that the private right of action to enforce §
601 does not include a private right to enforce these regulations.”
If section 602 does not confer a private right to enforce the disparate-impact regulations, then “a failure to comply with regulations promulgated under § 602 that is not also a failure to comply with § 601 is not actionable.” Examining the text of section
602, the Court concluded that it clearly lacks the “rights-creating
language” present in section 601. Instead, “the focus of § 602 is
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twice removed from the individuals who will ultimately benefit
from Title VI’s protection,” because it “focuses neither on the
individuals protected nor even on the funding recipients being
regulated, but on the agencies that will do the regulating.” The
Court indicated that § 602 merely prescribes how federal agencies may enforce the provisions of § 601 and applies restrictions
on that enforcement. In dissent, Justice Stevens asserted, “The
plain meaning of [section 602’s] text reveals Congress’ intent to
provide the relevant agencies with sufficient authority to transform the statute’s broad aspiration into social reality.”
Accordingly, “the regulations are inspired by, at the service of,
and inseparably intertwined with § 601’s antidiscrimination
mandate.” Therefore, he argued that “it makes no sense to differentiate between private actions to enforce § 601 and private
actions to enforce § 602. There is but one private action to
enforce Title VI, and we already know that such an action exists.”
Stevens concluded, “[T]oday’s decision is the unconscious product of the majority’s profound distaste for implied causes of
action rather than an attempt to discern the intent of the
Congress that enacted Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”
In yet another 5-4 decision, the Court in Buckhannon Board
and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and
Human Resources24 held that to be a “prevailing party” for the
purposes of fee-shifting statutes, there must be a judgment on
the merits or a court-ordered consent decree. Therefore, the
“catalyst theory,” which had been accepted by most courts of
appeal, is an impermissible basis for awarding attorney’s fees.
The Court began its opinion by asserting the predominance of
the “American Rule,” which is a “general practice of not awarding fees to a prevailing party absent explicit statutory authority.”
The Court said that the “view that a ‘prevailing party’ is one who
has been awarded some relief by the court can be distilled from
our prior cases.” It indicated that precedent reveals the common
thread “that enforceable judgments on the merits and courtordered consent decrees create the ‘material alteration of the legal
relationship of the parties’ necessary to permit an award of attorney’s fees.” Under the “catalyst theory,” a prevailing party is one
whose lawsuit brought about the voluntary change in the other
party’s conduct, for which it hoped. The Court held the catalyst
theory inconsistent with the Court’s prior decisions because “it
allows an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change
in the legal relationship of the parties.” Despite the contention
that the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act’s legislative history supports a “broad reading of ‘prevailing party,’” the Court
“doubt[s] that legislative history could overcome what [it]
think[s] is the rather clear meaning of ‘prevailing party’—the
term actually used in the statute.” Justice Ginsburg dissented,
arguing that the Court’s decision not only “upsets long-prevailing Circuit precedent” and “allows a defendant to escape a statutory obligation to pay a plaintiff’s counsel fees, even though the
suit’s merit led the defendant to abandon the fray,” but also
“impede[s] access to court for the less well-heeled, and shrink[s]
the incentive Congress created for the enforcement of federal
law.” In her opinion, “the judicial decree is not the end but the
means,” and “if a party reaches the ‘sought-after destination,’

then the party ‘prevails’ regardless of the ‘route taken.’”
In a 7-2 decision, the Court in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin25 held
that Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) protects access to professional golf tournaments by a qualified
entrant with a disability. Further, permitting that entrant’s use of
a golf cart does not “fundamentally alter the nature” of the tournaments. Casey Martin is a golfer with a degenerative circulatory
disease that is covered by the ADA and prevents him from walking the length of a golf course. The PGA Tour refused to waive
its tournament’s walking requirement despite Martin’s well-documented medical condition. Title III of the ADA prohibits the
discrimination of disabled individuals in places of public accommodation. After examining the text Title III, the Court then
looked to the facts of this case, which “fit comfortably within the
coverage of Title III, and Martin within its protection.” The PGA
Tour, as a lessor and operator of “golf courses,” which are
“specifically identified by the Act,” cannot prevent Martin’s “full
and equal enjoyment” of those courses. The Court rejected the
argument that Title I, which prohibits discrimination by employers, is more appropriate because Martin’s claim is “job-related”
since he is not a “client or customer,” but is instead like an independent contractor. Since Title I does not protect independent
contractors, the argument went, his claim necessarily fails.
However, the Court asserted that “it would be entirely appropriate to classify the golfers . . . as petitioner’s clients or customers”
because they pay for the chance to compete. Further, the PGA
Tour “simultaneously offer[s] . . . two ‘privileges’ to the public—
that of watching the golf competition and that of competing in
it.” The Court also concluded that Martin’s use of a golf cart,
which is a “necessary” and “reasonable modification,” would not
“fundamentally alter the nature” of petitioner’s tournaments
because “the essence of [golf is] shot-making” and the walking
rule “is not an essential attribute of the game itself . . . [nor an]
indispensable feature of tournament golf.”
In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.,26 the Court
held that the Environmental Protection Agency may not consider
implementation costs in setting national ambient air quality
standards under section 109(b) of the Clean Air Act (CAA).
Section 109(b) instructs the EPA to set primary ambient air quality standards “‘the attainment and maintenance of which . . . are
requisite to protect the public health’ with ‘an adequate margin
of safety.’” According to section 109(b)(1), “the EPA . . . is to
identify the maximum airborne concentration of a pollutant that
the public health can tolerate, decrease the concentration to provide an ‘adequate’ margin of safety, and set the standard at that
level.” However, “nowhere are the costs of achieving such a standard made part of that initial calculation.” The Court asserted,
“Congress was unquestionably aware” that “the economic cost of
implementing a very stringent standard might produce health
losses sufficient to offset the health gains achieved in cleaning
the air.” As a matter of fact, Congress “not only anticipated that
compliance costs could injure the public health, but provided for
that precise exigency” in “other provisions [that] explicitly permitted or required economic costs to be taken into account in
implementing the air quality standards.” Such is not the case

24. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
25. 532 U. S. 661 (2001).

26. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).

22 Court Review - Fall 2001

with section 109(b)(1). The Court “therefore refused to find
implicit in ambiguous sections of the CAA an authorization to
consider costs that has elsewhere, and so often, been expressly
granted.” The Court suggested that the cost of implementation
is a factor “that . . . is both so indirectly related to public health
and so full of potential for canceling the conclusions drawn from
direct health effects that it would surely have been expressly
mentioned in §§ 108 and 109 had Congress meant it to be considered.”
OTHER SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS

In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court in Cooper Industries,
Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.27 held that courts of appeals
should apply a de novo standard when reviewing district court
determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages
awards. Cooper Industries used photographs of Leatherman’s
multifunction pocket tool in its own posters, packaging, and
advertising materials; Cooper Industries ultimately was found
guilty of unfair competition. Leatherman was awarded $50,000
in compensatory damages and $4.5 million in punitive damages.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that “the district court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to reduce the amount of punitive damages.” Noting that “legislatures enjoy broad discretion
in authorizing and limiting permissible punitive damages
awards,” the Court affirmed that when juries determine awards
within those limits and “[i]f no constitutional issue is raised, the
role of the appellate court, at least in the federal system, is merely
to review the trial court’s ‘determination under an abuse-of-discretion standard.’” However, the Fourteenth and Eighth
Amendments place “substantive limits on that discretion.” The
Court indicated that in order to determine whether a punitive
damages award violates the Constitution, a court must determine
if it is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of . . . [the] defendant’s offense.” While “the factual findings made by the district
courts in conducting the excessiveness inquiry . . . must be

accepted unless clearly erroneous,” the Court has “expressly
noted that the courts of appeals must review the proportionality
determination de novo.” The Court concluded, “Independent
review is . . . necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control
of, and to clarify, the legal principles.” Furthermore, “de novo
review tends to unify precedent” and “stabilize the law.”
CONCLUSION

As can be seen from the cases addressed by the Supreme
Court this term, the ideological balance was extremely influential in many decisions. Some of the most important cases, like
Alexander v. Sandoval and Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett, were decided by votes of 5-4. Even in the
highly politicized Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court was unable to
unite and speak with one voice, which, as Justices Stevens and
Breyer seem to agree, may ultimately undermine the public’s confidence in the Supreme Court. The significance of the numerous
5-4 decisions lies not only in how the Court is perceived by the
public, but also in the stability of constitutional jurisprudence.
As many anticipate, several justices will retire in the coming
years. Due to the closeness of some of the most significant cases,
this may completely change the ideological course on which the
Supreme Court has traveled for the last several years.
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“You Don’t Have to Hear,
Just Interpret!”:
How Ethnocentrism in the California Courts Impedes Equal
Access to the Courts for Spanish Speakers
Roxana Cardenas

T

he judge sat on the bench. He proceeded to read the sentence into the microphone in front of him in a barely
audible, monotone voice. I interrupted, “Excuse me, Your
Honor, the interpreter cannot hear you. Can you please check
the microphone?” He replied, “You don’t have to hear, just
interpret!”
In shock and disbelief, I interpreted whatever I was able to
hear. I occasionally turned to look at the defendant’s attorney,
but he just sat there silent and motionless. As soon as the
criminal sentence was read into the record, I gathered the case
information I had not heard. I then shouted out pertinent
dates and numbers to the Spanish-speaking man in custody as
he was led away by the bailiffs.
Court interpreters in the United States are privy to scenes
such as this one on a monthly, weekly, or even daily basis,
depending on the court where one works.1 Similar occurrences were documented in a court interpretation services
study conducted by a New York committee composed of attorneys and judges.2 The New York study concluded, “A system
of justice that allows a litigant to move through the courts
without a complete understanding of the proceedings because
of a language barrier, is an affront to the concepts of due
process and equal protection.”3
At national court interpreter conventions, the author has
discussed with others perceptions about court interpreters
that impact equal access to the courts. A pertinent, but mistaken, assumption is that a court interpreter’s mere presence
at a proceeding automatically fulfills the requirements of the
law. Therefore, the interpreter is expected to play a purely
passive, unobtrusive role. Voicing a concern to the court, as
the author did by asking the judge to raise his voice, may be
erroneously perceived by the court staff as inappropriate or
even unnecessary.
A judge or an attorney may not know that an interpreter
takes an oath to interpret faithfully.4 If she feels that she cannot render a true interpretation, due to a hearing or vocabulary
problem, she is obligated to notify the judge. This obligation

stems from the fact that the defendant’s due process rights are
at stake. If the interpreter does not understand or hear a word,
there results one fewer word that a Spanish-speaking defendant is unable to hear, as compared to an English-speaking
defendant who hears for himself. The interpreter, by virtue of
her skill, can put the Spanish speaker in the shoes of the
English-speaking defendant. But when the interpreter’s
request to facilitate her interpretation to a defendant falls on a
judge’s deaf ears, it cannot be said that, relative to an Englishspeaking defendant, equal access to the courts has been
afforded to the purely Spanish-speaking defendant.
California’s justice system must work arduously to guarantee due process rights to its large Spanish-speaking population.
One way to accomplish this is by educating bench officers and
court staff about the court interpreter’s role. Thanks to recent
efforts by the Advisory Panel to the California Judicial Council
to pass court rules addressing interpreter-related issues, there
is hope on the horizon.
This article analyzes the legal field’s apparent lack of interest
in interpreter-related problems as a major barrier to ensuring
equal access to the courts for Spanish speakers. It also seeks to
dispel certain myths or misinformation about the function of
interpreters by delving into a particular infamous case that
involved the misuse of interpreters: the O.J. Simpson case.

Editor’s Note: This article was the winning entry in 2000 in the American
Judges Association’s annual essay contest for law school students. Each
year, we publish the winning entry in that contest in Court Review.

May 1994 at 38.
2. The New York City Bar Association’s Committee on Legal Needs
of the Poor spent 15 months studying this subject in its local
courts prior to May 1994. Id.
3. Id.
4. See FED. R. EVID. 604.
5. Pub. L. No. 95-539, 92 Stat. 2040, codified in pertinent part as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1827-28.

Footnotes
1. Mark Hansen, Litigant Language Barrier: In New York, Court
Interpreters Can Be Quickly Recruited, Poorly Trained, A.B.A. J.,
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I. PRIMARY STUMBLING BLOCK: A LACK OF
CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC EXPERTISE AMONG
JUDICIAL OFFICERS
A. IGNORANCE ABOUT THE ROLE OF COURT
INTERPRETERS DEFEATS THE PURPOSE OF THE
COURT INTERPRETERS ACT OF 1978
1. Court Interpreters Act of 1978
The Court Interpreters Act of 19785 (hereinafter “the Act”)
establishes that a non-English speaker has the right to a court

interpreter in the federal courts, but does not itself address the
state courts.6 Approximately twenty-two states recognize a
criminal defendant’s right to a court interpreter, via statutes or
state constitutions.7 The Act’s purpose is twofold: to ensure
that the criminal defendant can communicate with his attorney
and understand the proceedings, and to ensure that a testifying
witness understands and answers the questions propounded by
counsel or the judge.8 The dual purpose behind the Act is, in
fact, intertwined with the Sixth Amendment9 guarantees of the
right to counsel and right to confront witnesses.10 By reaching
non-English speakers via the use of interpreters in the court
system, the Act guarantees important constitutional rights that
transcend the Sixth Amendment alone.11
The Act does not automatically bestow an interpreter upon
a defendant who requests language assistance. It is sometimes
incumbent upon a judge, who may know little about assessing
English proficiency, to use his discretion in appointing an
interpreter.12 The exercise of judicial discretion may not guarantee the non-English speaker access to an interpreter if a lack
of linguistic assessment skills ultimately leads to an uninformed decision on the matter.13 For this reason, and because
decisions to deny an interpreter rarely get appealed, a judge’s
discretion in appointing an interpreter has been the subject of
severe criticism.14

Is the denial of equal access to the courts to Spanish-speaking defendants more likely to occur if the judicial officer
involved in his case has had little exposure to different cultures? Most certainly. A judicial officer who fails to take an
interest in the importance that languages and trained interpreters have in a courtroom may unknowingly violate a defendant’s constitutional rights—a situation I will document below.
The creation of a standard by which judges could assess interpreter need would help to prevent such unknowing violations.
Although only a handful of reported federal court cases

have been appealed to the cir[A]n immigrant
cuit level due to the denial of
will first learn to
an interpreter,15 they exemplify a lack of cultural-linguiscommunicate his
tic awareness. In a 1994
biographical
California case,16 the judge
withdrew an interpreter from information in the
the trial because the defendant second language,
testified to the jury, through
perhaps by
his interpreter, that he had
memorizing it.
lived in the U.S. longer than he
17
had lived in Cuba. The judge
This does not
suggested, “Lets try it in
mean that he
English.”18 When the defense
speaks the
attorney objected because his
foreign
language
client could not express himself in English properly, the
in question.
judge retorted, “Try it.”19 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit held
that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights had been violated.20 The judge’s error had been the use of the defendant’s
length of U.S. residency as the singular factor in assessing
English proficiency.21
Another mistake a judge may make during his evaluation of
English proficiency is to simply ask the Spanish-speaker biographic information in English, without inquiring if the defendant understands English.22 A culturally aware person might
readily understand that an immigrant will first learn to communicate his biographical information in the second language,
perhaps by memorizing it. This does not mean that he speaks
the foreign language in question. A sound judicial evaluation
would have to include open-ended questions such that a nonEnglish speaker could not anticipate an answer.
The epitome of cultural-linguistic unawareness is to hold a
bilingual person to the standard of a certified court interpreter,
as some judges do when they encourage a bilingual family
member to interpret criminal proceedings to the defendant,

6. ROSEANN DUENAS GONZALEZ ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT
INTERPRETATION: THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE 37 (1991) [hereinafter “FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION”].
7. Leslie V. Dery, Disinterring the “Good” and “Bad Immigrant”: A
Deconstruction of the State Court Interpreter Laws for Non-Englishspeaking Criminal Defendants, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 837, 840 n.23
(1997).
8. Mollie M. Pawlosky, Case Note, When Justice Is Lost in the
“Translation”: Gonzalez v. United States, An “Interpretation” of the
Court Interpreters Act of 1978, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 445 (1996).
9. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; . . . .” U.S. Const. Amend. VI.
10. FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 158-59.
11. Duenas explains that Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights are also
protected by the use of interpreters. In the case of searches and
seizures (Fourth Amendment), court interpreters may play a role
in transcribing and translating non-English documents that
result in warrants. During arraignment, court interpreters aid the
court in determining entitlement to the services of a public

defender (Fifth Amendment). Id.
12. Dery, supra note 7, at 843.
13. Id. at 846.
14. Critics from the different disciplines of linguistics, philosophy,
and the law disfavor judicial discretion when there is a lack of linguistic ability to recognize a particular defendant’s need for an
interpreter, and the competency of such an interpreter in the
English-language hegemony that is our justice system. Id.
15. Pawlosky, supra note 8, at 448, 490. As of 1996, only the Fifth,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits had decided interpreter denial cases. Id.
16. United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1994).
17. Pawlosky, supra note 8, at 453.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 455.
21. In U.S. cities with large Hispanic populations, a Spanish speaker
can survive without the use of English in his everyday life. The
author’s mother, a homemaker who rarely left the house, waited
20 years before she felt the need to learn conversational English.
22. Pawlosky, supra note 8, at 461.
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rather than request the services
of a trained interpreter. To
assume that the ability to speak
two languages means you can
interpret judicial proceedings is,
as Jon Leeth has noted, analogous to assuming that all people
with two hands can automatically become concert pianists.23
In fact, though, the courts
have a history of relying on nonappointed Spanish speakers to
act as interpreters for the defendants—case in point, United
States v. Sanchez.24 In Sanchez,
the judge allowed the defendant’s common-law wife to act as
interpreter, finding that the arrangement was acceptable
because it did not “inhibit comprehension”25— vague phraseology, indeed. In New York, a court clerk kept a trial going by
enlisting the help of a neighborhood Korean grocer.26 Just as
egregious, in Montoya v. Texas,27 the court held that since the
defendant in this murder case never objected at trial, he had no
right to appeal the fact that the court bailiff filled in as the
interpreter when a certified interpreter was unavailable. The
trial court based its belief that the bailiff was an adequate interpreter on the bailiff’s self-proclaimed competence.28 Montoya
concluded that even if appointing the bailiff as interpreter had
been an error, it was harmless error.29
These decisions point to a lack of understanding of the
court interpreter’s role, a basic lack of linguistic-cultural
awareness. This lack of awareness, coupled with a lack of procedures30 by which to evaluate interpreter need or interpreter
competency, makes the Act easier to violate.
Why not simply make the right to an interpreter automatic
upon request, as a number of critics suggest?31 This would certainly ease the burden of those judges who feel unqualified to
make linguistic-related decisions. Is it because judges feel obligated to make such decisions? The answer may be that absent

As Jon Leeth noted, merely being bilingual does not qualify
one to interpret, just like having two hands does not qualify
one to be a concert pianist.34 Interpreters earn their certification by passing a series of rigorous written and oral exams
administered by the State of California35 or by the
Administrative Office of the Courts.36 From 1978 to 1991, the
Federal Court Interpreter Exam for Spanish (written component of the test) was taken by 9,750 presumably bilingual candidates.37 Only 2,015 passed this written component, and of
these 2,015 who went on to take the oral portion, only 388
passed and became federal court interpreters.38 If it were only
a matter of being bilingual, there would have been 9,750 new
federal court interpreters, not a mere 388 new certified federal
court interpreters in the United States for that time period.
To pass rigorous interpreting exams, most interpreters
attend one-to-two-year certificate or master’s degree programs
in translation and interpretation in the United States or around
the world.39 A number of these interpreters are already lin-

23. FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 16
(Duenas quotes Jon A. Leeth, a federal court administrator: “Most
people believe that if you are bilingual you can interpret. That’s
about as true as saying that if you have two hands you can automatically be a concert pianist.”).
24. United States v. Sanchez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16725 (E.D. Pa.
Nov.16, 1994).
25. Id. at *6.
26. Hansen, supra note 1, at 38.
27. Montoya v. Texas, 811 S.W.2d 671, 672 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. California has enacted a Judicial Administration Standard Rule of
Court, Rule 18, which provides guidelines for judges to follow
when determining the need for a court interpreter. CAL. R. CT.,
APP., DIV. I § 18 (Deering 2001). See FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT
INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 595.
31. Dery, supra note 7, at 843.
32. Pawlosky, supra note 8, at 466.
33. David L. Lewis, Book Review, 9 CRIM. JUST. 48 (1994) (reviewing

SUSAN BERT-SELIGSON, THE BILINGUAL COURTROOM: COURT
INTERPRETERS IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1990)).
FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 16
(quote by Jon A. Leeth); see note 22 supra.
Roxana Cardenas, Lost in the Translation: Courtroom Interpreters
All Too Easily Are Made Scapegoats, L.A. DAILY J., March 24, 1995.
Because the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) is directly
responsible for the implementation of the Act, the AOC director
delegates the task of constructing the federal court interpreter
examination. SUSAN BERT-SELIGSON, THE BILINGUAL COURTROOM:
COURT INTERPRETERS IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 36 (1990).
FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 62.
Id.
Examples of such training programs are the UCLA Extension
Program in Court Interpretation or the California State University,
Los Angeles, Certification Program, which offers an array of
classes on different modes of interpretation. Other interpreters
attended European schools where they were trained to interpret
for international organizations, such as the United Nations. See
Cardenas, supra note 35.
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ethnocentrism in our justice system, we would already have
appropriate interpreter regulations in place, or no need for them.
B. DEBUNKING INTERPRETER MYTHS:
ONE STEP CLOSER TO EQUAL ACCESS
By enacting the Court Interpreters Act of 1978, Congress
acknowledged the specialized nature of court interpretation as a
skill that falls outside the classification of merely being bilingual.32 At the same time, court interpreters are occasionally seen
as “yet another piece of furniture in the well of the court.”33 It is
the latter perception of interpreters that is dangerous to the
Spanish speaker. To correct these and other mistaken assumptions about languages by judges or attorneys, common myths
about interpreters must be dispelled; namely, that interpreters
are merely bilingual, that an interpreter is the same thing as a
translator, and that a perfect translation is a literal translation.
1. Myth #1: Interpreters are Merely Bilingual

34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.

guists, former Spanish literature professors, or former attorneys from other countries. In these programs, they learn to
transfer all of the meaning heard from the source language into
a target language, not editing, summarizing, adding meaning,
or omitting, all in a matter of split seconds.40 A bilingual person is not born with these capabilities. It takes an inordinate
amount of skill and practice.
2. Myth #2: An Interpreter Is a Translator
An interpreter is not automatically a translator.
Translations are written, as opposed to interpretations, which
are oral.41 Therefore, the individuals we see in court should be
addressed as interpreters, never as translators.42 The court
interpreter may also be a court translator, but the performance
of this job as a translator will take place in an office setting,
perhaps at home, in front of the computer. The translator produces written documents in English or foreign languages, such
as a translation into English that was originally a taped conversation that took place in Spanish.
3. Myth #3: A Perfect Translation Is a
Literal Translation
There is no such thing as a perfect translation because interpretation is a mixture of art and science.43 Interpretations are
performed by humans and humans are not machines. Humans
get fatigued and respond to distracting stimuli. Because there
are no definite rules or vocabulary, two interpreters may give
different renditions of the same passage and both may be correct. In an afternoon of testimony, an interpreter might process
an average of 10,000 words.44 If one of these words should
escape her, it would still represent an accuracy rate of 99.9%.45
In other words, even the best interpreter will make an occasional mistake and still be considered an excellent interpreter.
A number of statutes and rules of court require that the

40. FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 155.
41. See Cardenas, supra note 35.
42. This is a common misconception further exacerbated by the television industry’s use on the screen of “voice of the translator”
when interviews/meetings are televised between two heads of
state of different countries. The screen should read “voice of the
interpreter” because the interpreter is working orally.
43. See Cardenas, supra note 35.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. In the court interpreting field, “verbatim” translation means a
“word-for-word” or “literal” translation. This is a misnomer
because verbatim translations are rare. Imagine having to interpret “latch-key child” or “PTA” meetings at school. These concepts probably do not exist in other countries and must be
explained by the interpreter in a short phrase. The same problem
arises with legal concepts that have no direct translation such as
“Mirandizing” someone, “six-packs” of photo lineups, or the
“three strikes” laws. Again, the interpreter must concisely
explain the meaning of the legal concept to the Spanish speaker.
47. FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 17.

interpreter provide a “verbatim46
There is no
record” of the proceedings while
such thing as a
interpreting witness testimony.47
Because “verbatim records” are
perfect transan impossibility, the court interlation because
preter mediates between two
interpretation
extremes of conveying meaning
and a conveying a verbatim
is a mixture
record.48 She does this while
of art and
manipulating registers of language
science.
from the most formal legalese used
during motions to the most informal jargon, such as slang.49 The interpreter performs all these
cognitive functions while interpreting for all courtroom parties
speaking at rates of 200 words or more per minute.50
C. THE ROLE OF THE COURT INTERPRETER:
EXPERT WITNESS OR COURT OFFICER?
The court interpreter is a language mediator who, through
interpretation, allows the defendant to be linguistically and
cognitively present in a legal setting.51 Accordingly, the proper
role of the interpreter is to place the non-English speaker, as
closely as is linguistically possible, in the same situation as an
English speaker in a legal setting.52
The interpreter is perhaps the only “officer of the court”
who renders “expert services,” here by rendering regular court
interpretation services. 53 Federal Rule of Evidence 60454 subjects interpreters to expert qualification rules. An expert witness interpreter may testify as to translations she or others
have done, or render opinions on questionable interpretations
that other colleagues have made. A court interpreter must easily adapt to the dual role occasionally required of her, whether
it is expert witness or interpreter/court officer. Despite the
dual role, the interpreter is only compensated as an interpreter
and never as an expert witness.55

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 155.
Id.
Officers of the court are employees or staff who work in the courtroom and are often administered oaths to comport themselves in
a dignified manner in all interactions with judges, counsel, other
court officers, defendants, and witnesses.
FUNDAMENTALS OF
COURT INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 160.
54. Rule 604 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: “An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these rules relating to qualification as an expert and the administration of an oath or affirmation to make a true translation.”
55. The pay rate of the interpreter does not increase because she is
testifying as an “expert witness.” In fact, the county may even
refuse to pay the interpreter her daily compensation. The county’s
justification for nonpayment is that an interpreter-witness does
not perform interpreting services while testifying as an expert;
this despite the fact that an interpreter may unwillingly become a
witness as a result of her regular job as a court interpreter.
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The infamous
O.J. Simpson
trial . . . provides
an illustration
of how the lack
of a rule . . .
can lead to the
use of unfair
tactics by
attorneys.

D. FLIPSIDE:
ETHNOCENTRISM OR A
FUNCTION OF SOUND
DECISIONS?

Some would argue that ethnocentrism56 is not the reason
why there is a dearth of statutes
and rules to aid the court in
interpreter-related situations—
they are simply unnecessary
because judges are already
making sound decisions pertaining to interpreter matters.
As delineated in the first part of
this article, it is unlikely that noninterpreters in certain situations can make sound decisions. Even a bilingual judge in a
city like Los Angeles is limited in his capacity to draft interpreter rules of court, hence the majority representation of
California interpreters on judicial rule-drafting panels.57
Some states are taking their first steps to wipe out ethnocentrism by recognizing that attitudes of cultural ignorance
exist.58 Once a state recognizes there is a problem in its courts,
it can prioritize its budget accordingly. California is one such
state that has been forced to examine its history, as described
in the following section.

II. EQUAL ACCESS TO THE COURTS FOR
SPANISH SPEAKERS HAS NOT BEEN
ACHIEVED IN CALIFORNIA
In Los Angeles County, there are 645 certified court interpreters.59 Of this total, 375 are Spanish court interpreters.60 Los
Angeles County provides interpreters for 91 different languages
and has access to168 languages via telephone interpretation.61
The overwhelming number of Spanish court interpreters, as compared to non-Spanish interpreters, is to be expected in a city that
is at 46.5% Hispanic.62 When one factors into the equation that
an interpreter may handle multiple cases in one day, the Spanish
caseload may easily exceed that of any other foreign language.63
The California Rules of Court are more likely to directly
impact the specific conduct and treatment of interpreters than a
general statute. Statutes on interpreters tend to be very broad,
whereas rules of court are more specific. If state or federal
statutes are not on point, a court interpreter, such as myself, will
seek guidance from rules of court or the interpreter code of
ethics. In fact, an interpreter may participate in drafting a rule
of court by being appointed to the Court Interpreters Advisory
Panel that makes rule recommendations to the California
Judicial Council.64 As will be shown below, current court rules
are far from perfect.
A. THE O.J. TRIAL: A CASE IN POINT
The infamous O.J. Simpson trial, of which the author has
some knowledge,65 provides an illustration of how the lack of a

56. To the author, a lack of cultural-linguistic expertise may arise out
of a lack of multicultural experiences, as is the case with a monolingual person in the United States who has never traveled abroad
or spoken another language by choice. The author refers to a person fitting this profile as “ethnocentric.”
57. The statute authorizing the Judicial Council Court Interpreters
Advisory Panel provides: “The panel shall include a majority of
court interpreters and may include judges and court administrators, members of the bar, and others interested in interpreter services in the courts.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68565 (Deering 2001).
58. For example, in 1997, Wisconsin State Supreme Court Justice
Janine Geske and state bar association members established a
commission on racial and ethnic bias in the courts. The commission’s area of study will include sentencing patterns and court
interpretation. See News, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, June 22,
1997. See also Ellen McCarthy, Annual Report; Keeping California
Courts Fair and Accessible, 1998 CAL. JUD. COUNCIL, ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE CTS. VOL. III, at 18, 24, 41 (discusses strides made by the
Racial and Ethnic Bias in the Courts Advisory Committee).
59. Telephone interviews with Gregory Drapac, Los Angeles County
Assistant Court Manager, Interpreter Services (Oct. 13, 1998, and
April 17, 2000).
60. Id.
61. The Los Angeles courts subscribe to Language Line Services (formerly AT&T Telephone Interpreting Services), whereby interpreting languages that may not be available in Los Angeles can be
accessed by phone. If no interpreters for an obscure Mexican
tribal language are found in Los Angeles, the courts may pay
AT&T to locate an interpreter for that language who will interpret
by phone from where she is living. Id.
What is unknown to the defendant and his defense attorney is
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62.

63.

64.

65.

exactly what standard Language Line Services uses in selecting its
interpreters and whether this standard is enforced. It is uncertain
whether Language Line Services’ standards are as rigorous as that
of certified court interpreters. Many certified interpreters work
for Language Line Services in their leisure time, but other people
work for Language Line Services precisely because they are not
certified to work in the courts.
Los Angeles is a city of 3.7 million inhabitants, of which 46.5%
were Hispanic in the 2000 Census. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE
HISPANIC POPULATION: CENSUS 2000 BRIEF (2001) (available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-3.pdf). In unincorporated East Los Angeles, the Hispanic population percentage
was 96.8%, the highest concentration of Hispanics in any community in the United States with 100,000 or more in population.
Hector Becerra & Fred Alvarez, Census Reflects Large Gains for
Latinos, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2001 (available at
http://www.latimes.com).
According to Mr. Drapac, the courts do not keep track of the
number of Spanish cases done by interpreters. A single interpreter may handle 1 to 20 cases a day. Because the interpreter is
not required to keep count, there is no record of how much work
is actually done. Drapac interview, supra note 59.
The panel is mainly composed of interpreters who have the necessary expertise to advise the judges and administrators while
drafting rules. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68565 (Deering 2001).
The author worked in the same building and belonged to the
same pool of interpreters that provided services for the Simpson
criminal trial. She regularly spoke with her colleague interpreters
who worked directly on it. The result of these experiences led her
to write the Los Angeles Daily Journal piece published on March
24, 1995. See Cardenas, supra note 35.

rule (due to a lack of interest) can lead to the use of unfair tactics by attorneys. The problem arose out of the defense team’s
insistence on a Salvadoran court interpreter as a replacement
for the first interpreter, who was Mexican-born. This first interpreter had been assisting a Salvadoran-born defense witness,
Rosa Lopez.66 There was talk in the media of the imprecise
interpretation by the Mexican-born interpreter, although no
direct accusations were made.67 The first interpreter was
removed; her reputation, once impeccable, in question.68
1. Confusion

order, denied most nationalityThe removal of
matching interpreter requests.
the interpreter
We interpreters reeducated the
court staff on a daily basis by
created mass
explaining why these interpreter
confusion
requests were impossible to
meet. As a result of this most among the court
unusual removal of an interstaff and the
preter by the defense team, many
general public.
interpreters, including myself,
concluded that this was a ploy to
win more time to prepare Rosa Lopez for testimony.72

The removal of the interpreter created mass confusion
among court staff and the general public. What the public did
not know, nor the defense team, was that interpreters rarely get
assigned to court cases based on their race or country of origin.69 Not only would it be impractical to do so, but the courts
operate on the assumption that all California certified court
interpreters are competent to interpret a broad use of Spanish
that may be used in as many as 20 different countries that
speak Spanish. This is because all interpreters basically take
the same variation of a test70 that may include a combination
of Mexican, Salvadoran, Colombian, and/or other Latin
American discourse and slang.71
It would be impossible for interpreters to become familiar
with obscure colloquialisms from every Spanish-speaking
region. Like an English speaker who cannot know every word
in the English language, or may not know that a British person
calls an elevator a “lift,” the Spanish interpreter cannot know
every word in both languages, nor every usage of a word in all
20 or more Latin American countries where Spanish is spoken,
plus Spain.
The confusion was so great that court clerks started requesting nationality-matching interpreters for their cases. The
county’s interpreter assignment office, unable to fill such a tall

As the saying goes, a little knowledge can hurt you. Along
the same lines, thinking you know a little Spanish may hurt
you, especially if you challenge a court interpreter’s work.
Bilingual or semi-bilingual attorneys will most often engage in
such practices. How the judge reacts can vary widely between
courts since there are no guidelines to follow in such a confrontation.73
Without a court rule, the attorney is free to cast doubt on
almost anything that sounds suspect, especially if his case is
not going well. The O. J. Simpson defense attorneys did so,
and the California Federation of Interpreters reacted to Judge
Ito’s acquiescence at a Judicial Council Advisory Panel
Committee meeting held on September 23, 1995.74
The California Federation of Interpreters urged the court to
recognize that the “expert witness” status of court interpreters
precludes an attorney, with no interpreter certification, from
challenging the work of a California certified court interpreter.
Only an interpreter-expert witness can state credible grounds
for the impeachment of another interpreter-expert witness.75
A mere layperson cannot.76 The California Federation of

66. Id.
67. This first interpreter informed the author that she was not
removed due to an imprecise interpretation. The interpreter
office based the change of interpreter on the defense’s unusual
request for a Salvadoran interpreter.
68. If a proper rule of court standardizing a procedure by which an
attorney can challenge an interpreter had existed, this interpreter
would probably not have been removed merely for being
Mexican-born.
69. If this were the case, there would be a shortage of Mexican interpreters for the large proportion of Mexican Spanish speakers in
the courts. There would also be an overabundance of Peruvian or
Chilean interpreters for the small number of same-nationality
cases.
70. California Personnel Services (CPS) has administered the Spanish
certification test for many years. This author studied variations of
CPS tests in order to become certified. Each year, the tests had
roughly the same difficulty level, with variations in words, transcript subjects, and test proctors. Today, the Judicial Council indirectly administers the test through the CPS and has entertained
bids from different non-CPS testing entities. Interview with Judge
Jaime A. Corral, member of the Court Interpreter Advisory Panel
to the California Judicial Council (Sept. 19, 1998).

71. In effect, the interpreter becomes more familiar with different
varieties of Spanish every day. As a result, many interpreters
compile glossaries of new words, obscure expressions, regionalisms, and the like. This enables the interpreter to become more
skilled every day.
72. See Cardenas, supra note 38.
73. A number of judges will require the attorney and the interpreter
to go to sidebar to “duke it out.” The interpreter usually wins
based on her certification because the judge will refuse to hear the
attorney’s argument if the attorney is not a certified court interpreter. Another option for the court is to call another interpreter
to get a second opinion.
74. Memorandum from Alex Abella, Vice-Chair of Greater Los
Angeles Chapter of Court Interpreters Association (GLAC)
Political Action Committee, to General Membership of GLAC
(Sept. 23, 1995) (on file with the author). GLAC is now known
as the California Federation of Interpreters. The Abella memorandum was a summary of his address to the panel urging action
on interpreter impeachment and substitution.
75. Id.
76. Challenges to an expert witness’s testimony are usually done by
the opposing attorney’s expert witness on the same subject—not
by an attorney who is a layperson on the subject matter.

2. Abuse by O.J. Defense Team
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To this day, no
rule of court
establishes a
procedure for
an attorney
to follow
should he
disagree with
the Spanish
interpretation.

Interpreter’s presentation ended
with a call to implement a procedure whereby interpreter substitution does not become a routine
event, needlessly brought about
by an attorney claiming to know
the language better than the
interpreter.77
B. HOPE FOR AN
INTERPRETATION
CHALLENGE PROCEDURE?

To this day, no rule of court
establishes a procedure for an
attorney to follow should he disagree with the Spanish interpretation.78 The California Federation of Interpreters will no
doubt continue its lobbying efforts before the Judicial Council
committees.
On the brighter side, a procedure was adopted in 1999
under which the interpreter may request a conference with the
witness (and attorney calling the witness) prior to his testimony.79 This is allowed to better acquaint the interpreter with
the witness’s usage of Spanish and any unusual vocabulary he
may use during his testimony. The pre-testimony conference
has the effect of raising accuracy levels of interpretation
tremendously.80

77. Abella memorandum, supra note 74.
78. All that’s provided for in the rules is a suggested instruction to
counsel in cases in which interpreters are used that “any objection
[be directed] to the court and not the interpreter” and that counsel should “[a]sk permission to approach the bench to discuss the
problem.” CAL. R. CT., APP., DIV. I § 18.1 (Deering 2001).
79. CAL. R. CT., APP., DIV. I § 18(e) (Deering 2001). Such a conference
is to be allowed “if the interpreter needs clarification on any
interpreting issues,” including colloquialisms, slang, and technical terms. Id.
80. A golden rule in interpretation training is to assimilate as much
information as possible prior to interpreting the subject matter at
hand. For example, an interpreter will review ballistics terminology in English and Spanish prior to interpreting in a trial in which
a ballistics expert is expected to testify. This ensures accuracy
because an interpreter may not have ready knowledge of ballistics
vocabulary. The same rule applies to the testimony of any witness
who may use an expression unknown to the interpreter or street
names that may be confusing. A pre-testimony conference affords
the interpreter the chance to clarify any confusion or research a
word prior to testimony. It allows the interpreter to interpret with
the highest degree of accuracy.
81. CAL. R. CT., DIV. IV, R. 984.2(b)(2) (Deering 2001). Applicable to
trials in criminal and juvenile delinquency proceedings, the rule
allows a judge to appoint an interpreter who is not certified if the
interpreter is “provisionally qualified” and the judge finds that
“good cause exists to appoint the noncertified interpreter.” Rule
984.2(b)(3) allows the appointment of a noncertified interpreter
to handle “brief, routine matter[s],” even if not the interpreter is
not “provisionally qualified,” at the request of a defendant or
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C. AN OVERBROAD “GOOD CAUSE” CLAUSE LEAVES
THE QUALITY OF INTERPRETATION IN DOUBT.
Rule 984.2 (b)(2),81 known as the “good cause” clause,
provides the courts with the option to use an uncertified interpreter, provided certain conditions showing “good cause” are
met.82 It is the source of much dissension among judges and
interpreters because it lends itself to abuse by the courts,
thereby bypassing the assignment of certified court interpreters. The courts favor it because it is a tool of expediency,
specifically preventing “burdensome delays.”83
For the Spanish speaker, the “good cause” clause signifies a
step back in the struggle for equal access, hearkening back to
the days of self-proclaimed interpreters such as relatives, court
staff, and the like. This rule violates the purpose of the Court
Interpreters Act and is a blow to the profession of certified
court interpretation.84 It brings the bilingual up to the level of
a certified court interpreter once again. Even more disturbing,
section (c)(1) of Rule 984.2 permits a nonqualified person to
act as a Spanish interpreter for two consecutive six-month
periods if the judge finds that there is “good cause.”85
The efforts of the Advisory Panel to tighten conditions
attached to the invocation of the “good cause” clause culminated in 1997 when a representative of the MexicanAmerican Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) sat
on the Advisory Panel for Court Interpretation. The representative communicated to the California Interpreters Association
her efforts to eventually eliminate the “good cause” clause with
regard to the Spanish language. This feat remains an unat-

82.

83.

84.

85.

minor if necessary to “prevent burdensome delay or in other
unusual circumstances.” CAL. R. CT., DIV. IV, R. 984.2(b)(3)
(Deering 2001).
Id. §984.2(b)(3) See (3) to interpret a brief routine matter (i) if
the defendant has waived the appointment of a certified interpreter, (ii) finds that good cause exists . . . etc.
The author’s experience is that it is entirely in the judge’s discretion to decide what constitutes a “burdensome delay.” A judge
may invoke the “good cause” clause if he needs an interpreter, but
no interpreter is available. This tends to occur with non-Spanish
interpreters, who are fewer in number. If the judge does not wish
to wait a full day or longer for a certified interpreter, he may
invoke the “good cause” clause.
If the good cause clause exists to allow nonqualified people to
interpret, what is the point of seeking training to become qualified? Certified interpreters must pass tests and comply with continuing education requirements, much like attorneys. If they do
not do so, they are dropped from the Judicial Council list of certified interpreters. Per Rule §984.2(c)(1), six-month Spanish
interpreters neither take tests nor comply with continuing education. The incentive to become a certified interpreter is undermined if a nonprofessional can be deemed an interpreter for a
one-year period (two consecutive six-month periods are allowed)
without having to take a test or comply with continuing education requirements.
Rule 984.2(c)(1) provides that in counties with more than 80,000
people, “a noncertified interpreter of Spanish may be allowed to
interpret for no more than any two 6-month periods.” CAL. R.
CT., DIV. IV, R. 984.2(c(1) (Deering 2001).

tained objective today because the MALDEF representative’s
term expired before a drafted rule was introduced. MALDEF
nonetheless paved the way to “good cause” clause reform.
Undoubtedly, community representation on the panel by
groups such as MALDEF is one of the most effective ways
Spanish speakers wield power with respect to the courts.
In 1999 the Advisory Panel mandated a limit of two consecutive six-month periods (within the “good cause” clause)
that a person may be deemed a court interpreter.86 The
MALDEF representative posited while on the panel that there
was no need for the “good cause” clause to be implemented
with respect to Spanish interpreters. With a list of more than
300 certified Spanish interpreters in Los Angeles County
alone, a court cannot claim that there is “good cause” to deem
anyone else a Spanish interpreter. The “good cause” clause
should be used as a last resort, not as a mere tool of expediency.
Until the California Rules of Court reflect a true understanding of the importance of the court interpreter to
California’s court system, the Spanish speaker will remain on
the fringes of attaining fair and equal treatment as compared
with his English-speaking counterpart. A better result is possible only if California’s judges and judicial administrators recognize that different cultures and languages are represented in
many of our multicultural courtrooms on a daily basis. As a
result, the interpreter is a necessary part of the daily functions
of the court. The appropriate recognition and use of the certified court interpreter’s skills is the key to justice for the
Spanish speaker in the California court system.

Roxana Cardenas has been a certified court
interpreter in California state courts since 1989
and in the federal courts since 1996. She holds
a Master of Arts degree in Spanish
Translation/Interpretation from the Monterey
Institute of International Studies. Her years of
experience derive from having worked in as
many as 40 different courts in Los Angeles
County. She is currently employed as a court interpreter and is a
recent graduate of Southwestern University School of Law in Los
Angeles, California.

LETTERS
Opinion Writing and Footnotes
I applaud the attention given opinion writing in the
Summer 2001 issue of Court Review. Most decisions I make in
a busy Indiana juvenile court as a magistrate are made immediately and without a detailed opinion. However, in the custody and visitation realm, there are occasions when a deliberative and detailed analysis is needed.
In those cases I submit detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, not because of a need to define the case for higher
review or because I have been asked to, but because the issues
involved and the decisions made critically affect relationships
between parents and children. Such cases to me merit an
explanation to the litigants of what and why the decision has
been made.
Having had the opportunity to study with F. Reed Dickerson
in the late 1960's at Indiana University—he was cited by
Joseph Kimble as "the father of legal drafting" in the United
States—and the benefit of participating in a presentation by
Bryan A. Garner to the Indiana judiciary several years ago, I
acknowledge a need to control a personal tendency to be
wordy. Though the objective is not always attained, I do make
an effort to cut back. Helpful in the process is the advantage
given by modern word processing, i.e., an ability to instantaneously see and revise while thoughts are fresh.
Though I recall some disdain by Professor Garner for the use
of footnotes in trial court opinions, I continue to use them to
include specific statutes, common-law principles (invariably in
the family law realm I find something useful from Blackstone’s
Commentaries), etc., that may be known to the lawyers
involved but not always to the litigants, who truly are "concerned about the underlying reasons" why a particular decision
which affects the most basic of relationships has been made.
Thanks for an interesting and useful primer.

Harold E. Brueseke, Magistrate
St. Joseph Probate Court
South Bend, Indiana

86. Corral, interview, supra note 70

COURT REVIEW
AUTHOR SUBMISSIONS WELCOME
Court Review invites the submission of original articles, essays, and book reviews. Court Review seeks to provide practical,
useful information to working judges. In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be of use to judges in their
everyday work, whether in highlighting new procedures or methods of trial, court or case management, providing substantive information regarding an area of law likely to be encountered by many judges, or by providing background information (such as psychology or other social science research) that can be used by judges in their work. Guidelines for the
submission of articles, essays, or book reviews for Court Review are set forth in detail on page 25 of the Summer 2001
issue. For more information, contact Court Review's editor, Judge Steve Leben, at (913) 715-3822 or by e-mail:
sleben@ix.netcom.com.
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NEW BOOKS
GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE
PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF
JAPANESE AMERICANS. Harvard Univ. Press,
2001 ($27.95). 310 pp.
Canadian history professor Greg
Robinson has pieced together from
hundreds of sources the events and
considerations that led to President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1942 order for
the
internment
of
JapaneseAmericans. Although the timing was a
complete coincidence, its publication
after the events of September 11 provides an opportunity to move back in
time to a similar situation to see how
events and policies unfolded.
As Judge Procter Hug noted in his
speech at the American Judges
Association annual educational conference in Reno in October (see pages
5-6 of this issue), the internment of
Japanese-Americans has been soundly
criticized in later years, both in scholarly discussions and in court opinions.
What Professor Robinson adds to the
discussion is a straightforward presentation, in Watergate terms, of what
President Roosevelt knew and when
he knew it. Robinson concludes that
Roosevelt failed to recognize and transcend the prejudice that infused the
movement to intern JapaneseAmericans and that he “bears a special
measure of guilt” for never projecting
any real sympathy or consideration for
these people.

C
ARTICLES ON JUDICIAL ETHICS
David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the
Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 509 (2001).
University of Minnesota law professor
David McGowan has provided an
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interesting commentary on interrelationships between judicial writing, the
role of the judge in our legal system,
and judicial ethics. He proposes—and
discusses potential objections to—four
rules:
1. Judges should speak candidly and
speak first to the parties and their
dispute.
2. Judges should write their own published opinions. They should not
have law clerks or anyone else do
the writing for them.
3. A published opinion should discuss
the resolution of an actual dispute
and try to use the dispute to
develop the law in a way useful to
society and in particular to those
whose situation is similar to that of
the parties. Opinions that do not
should not be published.
4. An opinion should not be published to make a point of general
political content, nor should an
otherwise appropriate opinion
make such a point.
Of at least equal interest, Professor
McGowan applies these rules to a fascinating exchange from the published
opinions of the Ninth Circuit in a
death penalty case in which various
internal court memoranda and procedures became an issue both before that
court and before the United States
Supreme Court. Any judge who regularly writes opinions will find this article of interest.
Steven Lubet, Bullying from the Bench, 2
GREEN BAG 2D 11 (2001).
[Available on the web at www.greenbag.
org.]
Even if you’ve neither heard of United
States District Judge Samuel B. Kent,
who sits in Galveston, Texas, nor read
one of his opinions chastising incompetent attorneys, you should read
Professor Lubet’s pithy chastisement of
Judge Kent. Many of our readers
probably have seen e-mails exchanged
among judges quoting from some of

Kent’s opinions, such as one accusing
the attorneys of having “obviously
entered into a secret pact—complete
with hats, handshakes, and cryptic
words—to draft their pleadings
entirely in crayon on the back sides of
gravy-stained paper place mats, in the
hope that the Court would be so
charmed by their child-like efforts that
their utter dearth of legal authorities in
their briefing would go unnoticed.”
Professor Lubet finds Judge Kent to be
an exemplar of a more general problem of abuse of power by judges.
Lubet argues that opinions of this type
exploit the inherent inequality of
power between judges and lawyers;
that they further reduce civility in the
courts; and that they unnecessarily
lead clients to question whether justice was the aim of the proceeding. In
addition, he notes that the zealous
advocacy upon which the legal system
depends may be tempered by a desire
to reduce the risk of public humiliation from a judge who regularly
engages in such conduct.
Steven Lubet, Stupid Judge Tricks, 41 S.
TEX. L. REV. 1301 (2000).
All judges need an occasional review
of the applicable ethics rules. Reading
this article by Professor Lubet won’t
cover all of the rules, but it is an interesting reminder of situations that have
led to significant sanctions against
judges. The article arose from Lubet’s
practice of keeping a folder next to his
desk labeled, “Stupid Judge Tricks.”
He has regularly put case reports and
newspaper stories into it for use in
updating the treatise on judicial ethics
he coauthored. First, he defines “stupid judge tricks” as those violations
“that cause you to scratch your head in
wonderment and exclaim, ‘What could
that judge have possibly been thinking?’” Then, he covers a variety of
examples and tries to draw conclusions about the causes of such behavior, as well as how it can be prevented.

